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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON INTERAREA WAGE DETERMINATION 
By 
JOHN V. WINTERS 
AUGUST 2009 
Committee Chair:    Dr. Barry T. Hirsch 
Major Department:  Economics 
This dissertation consists of two essays concerning the determination of wages across 
areas.  The first essay investigates the equilibrium relationship between wages and prices across 
labor markets.  Of central interest is the extent to which workers receive higher wages to 
compensate for differences in the cost of living.  According to the spatial equilibrium hypothesis, 
the utility of homogenous workers should be equal across labor markets.  This implies that 
controlling for amenity differences across areas, the elasticity between wages and the general 
price level across areas should equal one, at least under certain conditions.  We test this 
hypothesis and find that the predicted relationship holds when housing prices are measured by 
rents and the general price level is instrumented to account for measurement error.  When 
housing prices are measured by housing values, however, the wage-price elasticity is 
significantly less than one, even using instrumental variables. Rents reflect the price paid for 
housing per unit of time and are arguably the superior measure.  Thus, findings in this essay 
provide support for the full compensation hypothesis.  These findings also have important 
implications for researchers estimating the implicit prices of amenities or ranking the quality of 
life across areas.   
The second essay uses a national level dataset and a spatial econometric framework to 
examine the effects of teacher unions and other school district characteristics on teacher salaries.  
ix 
 
The results confirm that salaries for both experienced and beginning teachers are positively 
affected by salaries in nearby districts.  Investigations of the determinants of teacher salaries that 
ignore this spatial relationship are likely to be misspecified.  We find that union activity 
increases salaries for experienced teachers by as much as 16-21 percent but increases salaries for 
beginning teachers by a considerably smaller amount.  This result is consistent with predictions 
from a median voter model.   
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ESSAY I: WAGES AND PRICES: ARE WORKERS FULLY COMPENSATED FOR 
COST OF LIVING DIFFERENCES 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of studies have shown that wages differ across labor markets even after control 
for observable individual characteristics.1  Such wage dispersion across markets can in part be 
attributed to differences in prices and amenities across areas.  If a city has higher prices for goods 
and services providing a given level of utility, workers will require higher wages to work there.2  
Similarly, if a city has nicer amenities, all else the same, workers will be willing to accept lower 
wages to work there.  In order for a spatial equilibrium to occur, utility must be equal across 
areas for workers with identical skills and preferences.  In previous literature, this is sometimes 
referred to as the competitive hypothesis or the law of one wage.  Many studies have attempted 
to test the competitive hypothesis (e.g., regional wage gap studies), but they are often hindered 
by limited information on area prices and amenities.     
Several studies interested in interarea wage differentials have used an interarea price 
index to fully adjust wages for price differences by dividing nominal wages by the price index.3  
Other studies have used fully adjusted wages to measure the implicit prices of amenities across 
cities (e.g., Rosen 1979; Greenwood et al. 1991; Glaeser and Tobio 2008).4  DuMond, Hirsch, and 
Macpherson (1999), however, suggest that full adjustment for prices may be inappropriate to 
measure interarea wage differentials, say by region or city size.  They instead advocate using a 
partial adjustment whereby the log of the price index (and potentially higher order terms) is 
                                                            
1 See Dickie and Gerking (1989) for an early review of the literature on interarea wage differentials in the United 
States. 
2 In this paper, we often use the term city to refer to metropolitan areas.   
3 See for example, Coelho and Ghali (1971, 1973), Bellante (1979), Gerking and Weirick (1983), Johnson (1983), 
Sahling and Smith (1983), Dickie and Gerking (1987), and Farber and Newman (1987).  
4 See Gyourko, Kahn and Tracy (1999) for a review of the literature on amenity valuation and quality of life. 
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included as an independent variable in a log wage equation.  The coefficient on the log of the 
price index can be interpreted as the wage-price elasticity.  One hypothesis is that the elasticity 
between wages and the general price level is equal to one.  We refer to this as the full 
compensation hypothesis.  Researchers who fully adjust wages for prices implicitly assume that 
the full compensation hypothesis holds, but few studies have explicitly tested the full 
compensation hypothesis.   
Two studies that have estimated the elasticity between wages and prices are Roback 
(1988) and DuMond et al. (1999).  Roback (1988) uses a now discontinued cost of living index 
produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and estimates a wage-price elasticity of 0.97, both 
with and without controls for amenities, which would seem to lend support for the full 
compensation hypothesis.  As discussed below, a reexamination of Roback (1988), however, 
suggests that her measurement of prices is inappropriate and biases her estimates.   DuMond et 
al. (1999) use a price index based on the ACCRA Cost of Living Index and find a wage-price 
elasticity of 0.46 controlling for amenities and 0.37 absent amenities.  Thus, the magnitude of the 
wage-price elasticity and validity of the full compensation hypothesis are still open questions. 
This paper builds on earlier work by examining the equilibrium relationship between 
wages and prices, controlling for amenities.  We stress the word equilibrium because wages and 
prices are simultaneously determined.  While this paper does not provide evidence on the causal 
effect of prices on wages or vice versa, much can be learned from examining the equilibrium 
relationship between the two.  Following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), we develop a model 
that predicts that under certain conditions the elasticity between wages and the general price 
level should equal one controlling for amenities.  In other words, workers should be fully 
compensated for differences in prices across cities.  However, to the extent that the assumptions 
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of the model do not hold, the elasticity between wages and the general price level may differ 
from unity.  The relationship between wages and prices is ultimately an empirical question. 
We find that estimates of the wage-price elasticity are sensitive to whether housing prices 
are measured by housing values or rental payments.  Rents are the ideal measure of housing 
prices, the price paid per unit of time for the use of housing, but in practice housing values are 
often used to measure housing prices.  The preferred specification measures housing prices by 
rents.  Measuring housing prices by rents and using Ordinary Least Squares, we estimate the 
wage-price elasticity to equal 0.76, but OLS estimates may be downwardly biased due to 
measurement error in the price index, especially the non-housing price component.  
Instrumenting for the rent-based price index using rents for the previous year, the estimated 
elasticity between wages and the general price level is nearly identical to one.  Again, if rents are 
the ideal measure of housing prices, this finding provides strong empirical support for the full 
compensation hypothesis.   
When housing prices are measured by housing values, the estimated elasticity between 
wages and the general price level is never more than 0.5, even using instrumental variables.  The 
findings of this paper have important implications for researchers estimating the implicit prices 
of amenities or ranking the quality of life across areas.  First, when adjusting wages for prices, 
housing prices should be measured by rents and not values.  Second, it is shown that ignoring 
differences in non-housing prices, as often done, biases estimates of the implicit prices of 
amenities. 
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2. Theoretical Considerations 
This section develops a simple model of the equilibrium relationship between wages, 
prices, and amenities across cities and regions following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).  
Firms produce ଵܺ and ܺଶ according to constant returns to scale production functions using labor 
(ܰ), capital (ܭ), and land (ܮ) given locational differences in productivity due to amenities (ܼ): 
௜ܺ ൌ ௜ܺሺܰ, ܭ, ܮ; ܼሻ.  The marginal products of labor, capital, and land are all non-negative, but 
increases in amenities can either increase or decrease productivity.  The price of capital is 
determined exogenously in the world market and normalized to equal one, while the prices of 
labor (ܹ) and land ( ௅ܲ) are determined competitively in local markets.  In equilibrium, firms 
earn zero profits and the price of each good is equal to its unit cost of production (ܥ௜): 
 ܥ௜ሺܹ, ௅ܲ; ܼሻ ൌ ௜ܲ,  ݅ = 1, 2.       (1) 
 Workers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, where utility is a function of 
goods ଵܺ and ܺଶ and location-specific amenities: ܷ ൌ ܷሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ; ܼሻ.  Workers are mobile across 
cities and regions, and in equilibrium utility for identical workers is equal across areas.  The 
indirect utility function can be represented as a function of wages and the prices of ଵܺ and ܺଶ 
given amenities: 
 ܸ ൌ ܸሺܹ, ଵܲ, ଶܲ; ܼሻ.         (2) 
Taking the total differential of both sides of (2), setting ܸ݀ = 0, rearranging, and employing 
Roy’s Identity yields a slight variant of the equation used by Roback to estimate the implicit 
price of amenities (Eq. 5 in Roback, 1982): 
 ܹ݀ ൌ ଵܺ݀ ଵܲ ൅ ܺଶ݀ ଶܲ െ ௓ܼܲ݀.
5       (3) 
                                                            
5 Alternatively, we could have defined the expenditure function and used Shephard’s Lemma to obtain an equivalent 
result as in Albouy (2008b). 
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However, instead of solving for the price of amenities ( ௓ܲ), the equation is solved for ܹ݀.  
Dividing both sides of (3) by ܹ, converts the equation to logarithmic form: 
 ݀ lnܹ ൌ ሺ ଵܲ ଵܺ/ܹሻ݀ ln ଵܲ ൅ ሺ ଶܲܺଶ/ܹሻ݀ ln ଶܲ െ ሺ ௓ܲ/ܹሻܼ݀.       (4) 
 Equation (4) says that controlling for amenities, a one percent increase in the price of ଵܺ 
will require wages to increase by a percentage equal to the share of wages spent on ଵܺ in order 
for utility to remain constant.  The same is true for increases in the price of ܺଶ, and the result 
easily generalizes to the case of more than two goods.  In other words, the wage-price elasticity 
for a good should be equal to the budget share of the good, assuming that non-wage income is 
negligible.  Furthermore, if total consumption expenditure is equal to wage income, 
ଵܲ ଵܺ ൅ ଶܲܺଶ ൌ ܹ, then a one percent increase in the prices of all goods will require wages to 
increase by one percent to maintain equal utility.   
 While this interpretation of equation (4) is valid for small changes in prices, it may be 
less valid for large changes in prices as consumers respond to large price differences by altering 
their consumption mix.  However, if utility is Cobb-Douglas as assumed by Davis and Ortalo-
Magné (2008) and others, the elasticity between wages and the price of a good is equal to the 
expenditure share of the good even for large changes in prices.  To see this, let utility take the 
Cobb-Doulas form: ܷ ൌ ݂ሺܼሻ ଵܺఈܺଶሺଵିఈሻ.  Taking a monotonic transformation, the indirect 
utility function can be written as: ܸ ൌ ܥ ൅ lnܹ െ ߙln ଵܲ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻln ଶܲ ൅ lnሺ݂ሺܼሻሻ, where ߙ is 
the constant budget share for ଵܺ, ሺ1 െ ߙሻ is the budget share for ܺଶ, and ܥ is a constant.  
Holding utility constant across areas, ∂lnܹ/ ∂ln ଵܲ is equal to ߙ even for large changes in prices.  
In other words, Cobb-Douglas utility suggests that the elasticity between wages and the price of 
a good is equal to the good’s budget share even for large price changes.  Similarly, Cobb-Doulas 
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utility predicts that the elasticity between wages and the general price level should equal one.  
Workers would, therefore, require full compensation for price differences across cities. 
 The full compensation hypothesis has considerable intuitive appeal.  Suppose there are 
two cities with equal bundles of consumer amenities, but one city has higher prices for goods and 
services.  If the general price level in the expensive city is 10 percent higher than in the less 
expensive city, how much higher will wages have to be in the expensive city to keep workers 
from leaving for the other city?  Intuition seems to suggest that a worker would need 10 percent 
higher wages to compensate for the 10 percent higher price level.  In other words, workers would 
require full compensation for price differences holding amenities constant. 
 Workers may not be fully compensated for price differences for a number of reasons.  If 
workers are highly immobile or do not have sufficiently good information on wages, prices, and 
amenities in other cities, then migration may not arbitrage away interarea differences in wages, 
prices, and amenities.  In other words, barriers to migration may cause workers in some markets 
to have higher utility levels than comparable workers in other markets.  In reality though, 
workers are often quite mobile across markets.  Even if some workers are relatively immobile, 
the movement of marginal migrants between labor markets may result in an equilibrium 
relationship between wages and prices that yields equal utility across areas for all homogenous 
workers.   
 The relationship between wages and prices may also differ from full compensation if 
utility is considerably different from Cobb-Douglas and prices are very different across markets.  
Thinking of ଵܺ and ܺଶ in the above model as housing and non-housing consumption, a high 
degree of substitutability between housing and non-housing may cause the true elasticity 
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between wages and the general price level to be less than one.6  As will be shown later, housing 
prices are significantly more dispersed across areas than non-housing prices.  If workers can 
easily substitute away from housing consumption in places where it is relatively expensive, they 
will not have to be fully compensated for differences in housing prices.7  As a result, a fixed 
basket price index will overstate the true cost of living in expensive cities and cause the elasticity 
between wages and the general price level to be less than one.   
As hinted above, the wage-price elasticity also depends on the extent to which people 
save.  If consumption is less than wage income ( ଵܲ ଵܺ ൅ ଶܲܺଶ ൏ ܹ), the true wage-price 
elasticity should be less than one.  Conversely, if consumption is greater than wage income, the 
wage-price elasticity may be greater than one.  Evidence from the 2005 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey suggests that average consumer expenditures are indeed quite close to average after-tax 
wage income.  The ratio of average expenditures to average after-tax income in the 2005 CES is 0.94.  
The CES is a relatively small sample and there could be some misreporting (e.g., of income), but the 
available evidence indicates that assuming expenditures are equal to wage income may be a reasonable 
first approximation.   
There are, therefore, a number of reasons why the elasticity between wages and the 
general price level may be less than one.  Ultimately, the relationship between wages and prices 
is an empirical question.  We explore this relationship empirically in subsequent sections.   
                                                            
6 Cobb-Douglas utility implies an elasticity of substitution equal to one.  The limited literature has not reached a 
consensus on the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing.  Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) estimate 
the elasticity of substitution to be 1.17, but not statistically different from one at the 5% significance level.  Piazessi, 
Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) find estimates of 0.77 and 1.24 depending on the time period considered, neither of 
which is statistically different from one.  However, Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and McGrattan, 
Rogerson, and Wright (1997) estimate the elasticity of substitution to be 2.5 and 1.75, respectively.  Davis and 
Ortalo-Magné (2008) do not explicitly estimate the elasticity of substitution, but do find that the expenditure share 
on housing is roughly constant over time and across metropolitan areas suggesting that the elasticity of substitution 
is close to one. 
7 Consumers may also shift away from consumption of relatively expensive housing toward consumption of local 
amenities, especially since local residents can often consume natural amenities at very low marginal cost (e.g., 
climate and coastal location). 
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3. Empirical Considerations/Previous Literature 
   The theoretical model suggests that under certain conditions, the elasticity between 
wages and a composite price index is approximately one.  Based on the intuition behind this 
result, a number of researchers interested in interarea wage differentials have fully adjusted 
nominal earnings using an interarea price index and estimated log wage equations of the form: 
 ln൫ ௜ܹ௝/ ௝ܲ൯ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߝ௜௝,        (5) 
where ௜ܹ௝ is the wage for person ݅ in city ݆, ௝ܲ is the price level in city ݆, ܺ is a vector of 
personal characteristics, ߚ is the corresponding coefficient vector, and ߝ is an error term with 
mean equal to zero.  Along these lines, Johnson (1983) obtains the seemingly surprising result 
that fully adjusted wages were more dispersed across cities than were nominal wages, at least for 
men.8  DuMond et al. (1999), however, argue that full adjustment may be inappropriate.  Instead, 
they advocate using a partial adjustment where the dependent variable is the log of the nominal 
wage and the log of the price index is included as an independent variable on the right hand side: 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߠln ௝ܲ ൅ ߝ௜௝.        (6) 
Doing so, they find wage dispersion to be considerably lower across markets than with either 
nominal or fully-adjusted wages.9 
 Theory and empirics also suggest that wages are affected by attributes that make a city a 
more or less pleasant place to live.  Therefore, (5) and (6) can also be modified to include city-
specific amenity levels and a corresponding coefficient vector.  The parameter ߠ in (6) can be 
interpreted as the interarea wage-price elasticity.  If ߠ = 1, (5) and (6) are equivalent.  However, 
if ߠ is not equal to one, (5) may be misspecified.  Thus the value of ߠ is of considerable interest.  
                                                            
8 Johnson (1983) uses a pooled cross-section of 34 cities from the May Current Population Survey for 1973-1976 
with price data from the BLS for an intermediate standard of living for 1974.  
9 DuMond et al. (1999) use a pooled cross-section of 185 cities from the 1985-1995 CPS Outgoing Rotation Group 
files with price data from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index from the same period. 
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 Roback (1988) estimates equation (6) both with and without amenities and produces 
estimates of ߠ equal to 0.97 for both specifications.  DuMond et al. (1999), however, estimate a 
point estimate for ߠ of 0.46 with amenities and 0.37 without amenities with standard errors small 
enough in both cases to easily reject the hypothesis that ߠ = 1.  There are a number of differences 
between the two studies, such as the time period considered, the number of cities considered and 
the amenities included.  However, the most important difference is likely the price indices used 
and the way they are used.  Roback uses a now discontinued price index produced by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics from the Handbook of Labor Statistics, and DuMond et al. use a price index 
based on the ACCRA Cost of Living Index.  Measurement error may be more significant in the 
ACCRA price index, and this may explain some of the difference between the estimates of 
Roback (1988) and DuMond et al. (1999).  DuMond et al. reestimate their results using the BLS 
Urban Family Budget and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban Areas updated from its 1981 
value (the last year the BLS produced the index) using the city-specific CPI for a limited number 
of cities and find that the estimate of ߠ without amenities increases to 0.526.  This price index is 
much closer to the index used by Roback, but the coefficient estimate it yields is still much less 
than one.   
 Closer examination of the two studies reveals a more subtle distinction in the way the 
price indices are used.  DuMond et al. (1999) use the same price index for all workers within a 
given city.  In Roback (1988), on the other hand, the price variable used consists of “low, 
medium, and high standard of living budgets assigned based on individual family income and 
number of dependents” (p.41).  In other words, Roback assigns persons within a given city a 
different price value based on their income.  Presumably, her intent is to assign to each 
individual the most relevant price for their particular consumption bundle.  This approach creates 
10 
 
 
 
intra-city variation in prices, and a problem arises if the intra-city variation in prices is spuriously 
correlated with intra-city differences in wages.  In such a case, the coefficient on the price 
variable in the log equation will be biased.  In other words, if the average price index value 
across cities is greater for the high standard of living price index than for the intermediate index 
and higher for the intermediate index than for the low index, then the price index is on average 
increasing with income within cities.  Indeed, a separate analysis suggests that this is the case for 
the price information used by Roback.  As a result, regressing log wages on a log price variable 
constructed as such, the coefficient picks up a within-city effect in addition to the cross-city 
effect.  There may very well be differences in the relative cost of acquiring different standards of 
living within a city, but accounting for this by introducing intra-city variation in the price index 
that is explicitly tied to the observed wage is inappropriate.  The principal focus should be on 
cross-city and not within-city effects. 
 A further problem with Roback’s (1988) price variable is that she uses the actual budget 
dollar amounts instead of price index values.  The budgets formerly produced by the BLS are 
based on what it would cost a family of four in a given city to obtain a given standard of living.  
The BLS computes the budgets (ܤ௜௝) for each standard of living (݅) in each city (݆) by 
multiplying local prices ( ௜ܲ௝) by a basket of goods ( ௜ܺ௝) for each standard of living.   The basket 
is also allowed to vary across cities within a standard of living, but is intended to maintain a 
given standard of living across cities.  Ignoring temporarily that the basket varies across cities, 
recognize that ܤ௜௝ ൌ ௜ܲ௝ ௜ܺ.  Regressing ln ௜ܹ௝ on ln( ௜ܲ௝ ௜ܺ) is clearly not the same as regressing 
ln ௜ܹ௝ on ln ௜ܲ௝ because ௜ܺ is increasing with income.  If one were to use the same budget, 
ܤ௝ ൌ ௝ܲܺ, (e.g., the intermediate standard of living budget) for all workers within a given city 
and hence have no intra-city variation in budgets, then there would be no problem because taking 
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logs causes lnܺ to drop into the constant term.  Using budgets instead of price index values and 
allowing the budgets to vary across types of workers within cities means that the “price” variable 
is severely confounded by intra-city variations in consumption.  In other words, the estimates are 
biased by the fact that workers within a city who have higher wages also have higher standards 
of living and are assigned a higher consumption basket.   
 In work not shown, we attempt to replicate Roback’s (1988) empirical work and test the 
sensitivity of the results to alternative measurement of prices.  The results suggest that Roback’s 
estimates are biased by using budgets rather than index values and allowing the budgets to vary 
across workers within a given city.  We first estimate ߠ by assigning all workers in a given city 
the same index (or, equivalently, a common budget).  We find wage-price elasticity estimates 
without controls for amenities of 0.70, 0.56, and 0.45 using the low, intermediate, and high 
standard of living price indices.  We next assign budgets to workers based on standard of living 
similar to Roback (1988).  To do this, we assume that workers in the upper third of the within-
city income distribution have a high standard of living, workers in the middle third have an 
intermediate standard of living, and workers in the lower third have a low standard of living.  
Measuring prices in this manner, we find a wage-price elasticity of 1.00, again absent amenities.  
This coefficient is very close to Roback’s estimate of 0.97, especially considering the replication 
of how she assigns budgets is not exact.  This estimate is likely biased, though, because budgets 
are allowed to vary within cities, and hence the estimate largely reflects intra-city differences in 
consumption.  Alternatively, one can allow the price level to vary across standards of living, but 
include standard of living dummies, so that identification comes only from inter-city variation in 
12 
 
 
 
prices.  Such estimation yields a wage-price elasticity of 0.46.10  These results are quite 
interesting.  When identification comes only from variation in prices across cities, the estimated 
wage-price elasticity ranges from 0.45 to 0.70, depending on how prices are assigned.  When we 
allow identification from intra-city variation in assigned budgets, however, we get a coefficient 
equal to one.  Thus, it appears that Roback’s (1988) estimates are in error.  However, the 
replication of Roback (1988) here does not include amenities and does not account for 
measurement error in the price index.  In subsequent sections of this paper, we estimate the 
wage-price elasticity using more recent data controlling for amenities and using instrumental 
variables to account for measurement error.   
 Henderson (1982) also estimates a variant of equation (6) where he includes the log of 
housing prices instead of a composite price index.  The housing price measure used is the 
estimated ownership cost for housing for an intermediate budget in the BLS Urban Family 
Budget Data for Autumn 1977.  Other studies have included housing prices in wage equations as 
well, often as a control variable when the main investigation is something else, but Henderson is 
one of the few to include housing prices along with amenities in an analysis of interarea wage 
differentials.  Henderson is also one of the few studies in this area to look at after-tax earnings 
instead of pre-tax earnings.  He finds point estimates of 0.17 and 0.21 for the coefficient on log 
housing prices in alternate specifications that vary in the amenities included.  Henderson does 
not incorporate non-housing prices in his regressions, however, and he measures housing prices 
by ownership costs, though rents are likely preferable.     
 Two recent working papers by Albouy (2008b) and Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008) are 
also interested in the relationship between wages and prices.  Albouy (2008b) attempts to 
                                                            
10Similarly, including standard of living dummies and allowing the wage-price elasticity to vary by standard of 
living yields price coefficients of 0.59, 0.52, and 0.40 for the low, intermediate, and high standard of living groups, 
though the coefficients are not statistically different from each other at conventional levels.   
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construct improved quality of life rankings for cities by among other things incorporating non-
housing prices and federal income taxes into the rankings.  His main finding is that improved 
quality of life estimates rank large cities more favorably than has been the case using previous 
methods.  He also computes city fixed effects for log housing prices and log wages and regresses 
the log housing prices on log wages and amenities.  The regression yields a coefficient of 1.41.  
Based on his chosen parameters (for the budget shares of housing and non-housing, etc.), this 
suggests that his model quite accurately predicts the relationship between housing prices and 
wages across cities.   The empirical work in the current paper differs from that in Albouy 
(2008b) in at least two important ways.  First, Albouy uses combined data on housing values and 
rents to measure housing prices.  The preferred estimates, however, in this paper measure 
housing prices solely by rents.  As shown later, the results in this paper are significantly affected 
by measuring housing prices by values instead of rents.  A second difference between the current 
paper and Albouy (2008b) is that we estimate a wage-price elasticity, while he estimates a price-
wage elasticity.  In theory, the two should be multiplicative inverses, ceteris paribus, but in 
practice the two estimates differ in the treatment of non-housing prices.  Albouy does not 
explicitly control for non-housing prices, but instead infers non-housing prices from housing 
prices. 
 Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008) develop a model of the equilibrium relationship between 
wages and prices across cities that assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function and therefore that 
the expenditure share for housing is constant across cities.  They test their model by predicting 
city-specific rental values as a function of wages and comparing predicted rents to observed 
rents, where quality is held constant for both housing and labor.  Davis and Ortalo-Magné predict 
rents for city ݆ as a function of wages in the city according to the formula, ݎఫෝ ൌ ݎҧ ሺݓ෥௝/ݓഥሻଵ/ఈ, 
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where ݎҧ and ݓഥ  are the mean values of rents and household wage income across cities, ݓ෥௝ is 
household wage income in city ݆ fully adjusted for the price of non-housing goods, and ߙ is the 
constant expenditure share of housing, which Davis and Ortalo-Magné set equal to 0.24.  They 
find that observed rents are under-dispersed compared to what is predicted by their model, i.e., 
rents are too low in many high wage areas and too high in many low wage areas.  Davis and 
Ortalo-Magné concede that the omission of amenities from their analysis may adversely affect 
their results.  Measurement error in ݓ෥௝ may also partially explain their findings.
11 
 
4. Data and Methods 
 In the empirical section of this paper, we begin by estimating a variant of equation (6) 
that includes amenities (ܼ): 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߠln ௝ܲ ൅ ߛ ௝ܼ ൅ ߝ௜௝.       (7) 
We use earnings and individual characteristics data from the 2006 Current Population Survey 
Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files merged with data on prices and amenities from 
several sources.12  The sample used consists of all employed wage and salary workers ages 18-61 
(inclusive), who are not full-time students.  We also exclude all persons with imputed earnings to 
avoid imputation bias, which would bias ߠ toward zero (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; Bollinger 
and Hirsch 2006).13  The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage (ln ௜ܹ௝).  We use the 
reported hourly wage for workers who are paid by the hour and do not receive tips, commissions, 
or overtime.  For workers who are not paid by the hour or who receive tips, commissions or 
                                                            
11 This is conceptually similar to measurement error biasing the coefficient on wages in a rent regression toward 
zero. 
12 Prices and amenities are measured at the city level, where a city is defined as a Core Based Statistical Area or a 
Combined Statistical Area. 
13 Imputation bias would likely result because imputed earners are often assigned wages of workers in different 
metropolitan areas or even different regions. 
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overtime, the hourly wage is computed by dividing usual weekly earnings by the usual number 
of hours worked per week.   
 The preferred estimates adjust wages for federal income taxes, but we also estimate 
equation (7) using pre-tax wages for the sake of comparison.  As discussed by Henderson (1982) 
and Albouy (2008a,b), the progressivity of the federal income tax system causes workers in high 
wage areas to pay a higher percentage of their income in federal income taxes than workers in 
relatively low wages areas.  The marginal benefit, however, to an individual worker of her 
federal income tax contributions is zero because workers consume the same level of federal 
public services regardless of their federal tax payments.  In other words, while workers pay 
higher federal income taxes in high wage areas, they do not receive higher federal benefits.  
Consequently, when choosing among cities, workers are concerned with the wages they would 
earn net of federal taxes in each city instead of gross wages.    
 The present study does not adjust wages for social security contributions or state income 
tax payments.  It would be relatively straightforward to estimate social security contributions for 
individual workers, but estimating the benefits to workers of their contributions would be more 
difficult.  We could also estimate state income tax payments for workers, but adjusting wages for 
state income taxes is inappropriate unless we also adjust wages for other state and local taxes 
because states differ in their reliance on income taxes.  Even if we could compute the total 
burden of all state and local taxes to each worker, we would still need to account for the benefits 
from state and local expenditures that each worker receives.  Given the complexities involved 
with estimating the net fiscal incidence of social security payments and state taxes, we make no 
adjustment for them in the dependent variable.14  Because the dependent variable in this study is 
the log of the hourly wage, the analysis is only affected by social security payments and state 
                                                            
14 Hence, use of the term after-tax wages implies wages net of federal income taxes only. 
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taxes to the extent that their net fiscal incidence is not proportional to wages for homogenous 
workers in different areas.15  However, to the extent that the total net burden of social security 
and state and local taxes and expenditures for homogenous workers is higher (lower) in high 
wage areas, regression estimates of ߠ that only account for federal income taxes may overstate 
(understate) the true value of ߠ.   
 Federal income tax liabilities are not reported in the CPS-ORG files, but are instead 
estimated using the federal tax schedule and based on several assumptions.  We assume that all 
married couples file jointly and receive two personal exemptions and non-married persons have a 
filing status of single and receive one personal exemption.  Itemized deductions are assumed to 
equal 20 percent of annual earnings, where annual earnings are equal to usual weekly earnings 
times 48.3 (the average number of weeks worked for workers in the March CPS).  Taxpayers 
take the standard deduction if it is more than their itemized deductions.  Deductions and 
exemptions are subtracted from annual earnings to estimate taxable income.  Tax schedules are 
then used to compute federal tax liabilities.  We next compute the average tax rate for each 
taxpayer (߬௜௝), and then multiply the hourly wage by one minus the average tax rate to compute 
after-tax hourly wages ( ௜ܹ௝ሺ1 െ ߬௜௝ሻ). 
 All regressions include a number of individual characteristic variables intended to make 
workers roughly similar across cities.  The individual characteristics included are eleven dummy 
variables for highest level of education received, a quartic specification for experience, and 
dummy variables for mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories (Black, Asian, Hispanic, and 
other), female, married, employed part-time, enrolled part-time in school (measured for workers 
                                                            
15 To illustrate, suppose we have an equal rate tax (߬) on wages (ܹ) in all areas.  Wages net of the tax are ܹ(1-߬).  
Because the dependent variable is in logs, note that lnܹ(1-߬)) = lnܹ + ln(1-߬)).  Because τ is a constant, regression 
results will be equivalent (except for the constant term in the regression) regardless of whether the dependent 
variable is the log of pre-tax wages (lnܹ) or the log of after-tax wages (lnܹ(1-߬))). 
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under 25), union member, naturalized citizen, and non-citizen.  Additionally, we include nine 
occupation dummies, eleven industry dummies, and three dummies for whether the worker is a 
federal, state, or local government employee.  We also include 11 month-in-sample dummies.  
 The baseline price index is constructed using the ACCRA Cost of Living Index for 2006.  
The ACCRA index is produced quarterly based on prices collected by local chambers of 
commerce for a basket of 57 goods and services meant to be representative of actual consumer 
expenditures.16  The prices of the 57 goods and services are then weighted (based somewhat on 
CES expenditure data) to form a composite price index and six sub-indices for housing, 
groceries, utilities, transportation, healthcare, and miscellaneous goods and services.  However, 
the baseline price index based solely on ACCRA data may not accurately measure intercity 
variation in prices.  One prominent reason is that ACCRA measures housing prices as a weighted 
average of the price of two goods: apartment rent and homeowner principal and interest, with 
homeowner costs being given a much greater weight (.82) than apartment rent (.18).  Housing 
rents measure the price paid per unit of time for the use of housing, and are therefore the ideal 
measure of housing prices.17  Homeowner costs may be an inappropriate measure of the user cost 
of housing because they are based on housing values.  Homeownership involves both a 
consumption decision and an investment decision, and the value of a house is equal to the 
expected net present value of the income stream it generates.  If expected future growth in rents 
differs across cities and over time, then so will the ratios of rents to housing values.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that this is indeed the case (Clark 1995; Davis, Lehnert and Martin 2008).  
                                                            
16 While many of the goods in the index might be thought of as traded goods, the law of one price does not strictly 
hold because most goods are sold at retail.  Retailing in San Francisco is more expensive than retailing in Topeka, 
KS because of higher commercial land rents and higher wages needed to compensate for higher housing rents (and 
subsequently higher non-housing costs).  The spread of online shopping is likely to have important effects in 
pushing homogenous goods towards a single price, but this is not accounted for under current ACCRA methods. 
17 For this reason, the Consumer Price Index produced by the BLS measures housing prices solely by rents. 
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Housing values may even be subject to bubbles based on irrational speculation about the growth 
in future benefits (Case and Schiller 2003).  Therefore, measuring housing prices using house 
values is likely to be inappropriate because house values are not based solely on the present user 
cost of housing.  This may be especially true for recent years given the relatively large increase 
in housing values, especially in several metropolitan areas with a relatively inelastic supply of 
housing (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz 2008). 
 Additional difficulties arise with the ACCRA index because prices are not reported for all 
areas in each year.  This has two drawbacks.  First, ACCRA often contains no information on 
prices for a given city, and hence we must exclude the city from the analysis.  This limits the 
analysis to 167 cities, though the cities that remain account for 68 percent of workers in the CPS.  
A second problem is that prices are reported at the sub-metropolitan level and must be 
aggregated to produce city-level averages using population weights, yet not all areas within a 
metropolitan area are necessarily included.  To the extent that sub-metropolitan areas for which 
prices are reported are not representative of areas in the same city for which prices are not 
reported, the average price level in the city will be measured with error.  For a further discussion 
of issues associated with using the ACCRA index to measure interarea price differences, see 
Koo, Phillips, and Sigalla (2000). 
 To address the potential problems that result from using ACCRA data to measure 
housing prices, we also compute a modified price index that measures housing prices solely by 
rental costs from the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS).18  To do this, we use microdata 
available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) produced and distributed by 
Ruggles et al. (2008) to estimate quality-adjusted average gross rents for each city in the 
                                                            
18 The ACCRA Cost of Living Index also reports average rents for an area, but for a number of reasons quality-
adjusted rents from the ACS are likely preferable to rents from the ACCRA index. 
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sample.19  The first step is to regress log gross rents, ܴ, for each housing unit on a vector of 
housing characteristics, ܨ, and a vector of city-specific fixed effects, ߙ: 
 lnܴ௜௝ ൌ ܨ௜௝Γ ൅ ߙ௝ ൅ ݑ௜௝.        (8) 
The housing characteristics included are dummy variables for the number of bedrooms, the total 
number of rooms, the age of the structure, the number of units in the building, modern plumbing, 
modern kitchen facilities, and lot size for single-family homes.  The results for housing 
characteristics from this estimation are generally as expected and are reported in Appendix Table 
A.  We then use the estimated parameters to predict average gross rents for each city holding the 
housing characteristics constant at their mean level for the entire sample.20  We then divide the 
quality-adjusted average gross rents for each city by the mean across cities and multiply by 100 
to create a housing price index based on quality-adjusted gross rents.  We then compute a 
modified composite price index by taking a weighted average of the rent-based housing price 
index and non-housing prices from ACCRA, where housing prices are given a weight of 0.29 
and non-housing prices are a given a weight of 0.71.21  Weights are chosen based on calculations 
from the 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey suggesting that housing (based on gross rents) 
represents 29 percent of average consumption expenditures.22   
                                                            
19 Gross rents include rents as well as basic utilities (water, electricity, and gas) and home heating fuels (wood, 
kerosene, oil, coal, etc.).  These utilities are often included in rental payments for some renters, but not for others.  
Therefore, gross rents are more comparable across households because they include utilities and fuels for all renter 
households. 
20 If, however, there are unobserved aspects of housing quality that are correlated with wages in a city, the estimated 
wage-price elasticity may be upwardly biased. 
21 For these purposes, non-housing prices are computed as a weighted average of ACCRA sub-indices for groceries 
(0.13), transportation (0.25), healthcare (0.06), and miscellaneous goods and services (0.56).  Note, that this 
excludes utilities in addition to housing because utilities are largely already included in gross rents. 
22  Note that this expenditure share for housing differs from official reports of the CES expenditure share for both 
“Housing” and “Shelter.”  The housing share based on gross rents used herein includes certain utilities but excludes 
others and also excludes expenditures for household operations, housekeeping, and household furnishings.  The 
housing share of 0.29 also differs from the official CES tabulations in that homeowner housing expenditures are 
measured by implicit rents and not by out-of-pocket expenses such as mortgage interest. 
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 For the sake of comparison, we also compute a modified price index that measures 
housing prices by quality-adjusted housing values from the 2006 ACS computed in a manner 
similar to quality-adjusted gross rents.  For this second modified price index, housing prices are 
given a weight of 0.23 because values do not include utilities and non-housing prices (now 
including utilities) are given a weight of 0.77.   
 Summary statistics for several price variables are reported in Table 1.  As seen, the 
modified price index using gross rents is considerably less dispersed than both the baseline price 
index and the modified price index using housing values.  Equivalently, housing values are more 
dispersed across cities than are gross rents. Non-housing prices are much less dispersed across 
cities than both rents and values, but there is still considerable variation in non-housing prices.  
Appendix Table B lists the 167 cities included in the sample and their value for each of the three 
composite price indices. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Price Indices, 2006  
  Min. Max. St. Dev. 
Baseline Price Index 84.0 157.9 12.0 
Rent-based Modified Price Index 84.1 141.8 9.2 
Housing Value-based Modified Price Index 80.3 184.8 15.7 
Quality-Adjusted Gross Rents 66.4 184.4 20.0 
Quality-Adjusted Housing Values 46.9 395.0 52.9 
Non-housing Prices 86.7 124.4 5.7 
Notes: Un-weighted mean is normalized to 100.  Standard Deviation is un-
weighted.  Includes 167 cities. 
 
 
 In addition to estimating equation (7), we are also interested in the relationship between 
wages and the prices of housing and non-housing goods and services.  Therefore, we also divide 
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the price index into housing prices, ଵܲ, and non-housing prices, ଶܲ, and include them in 
logarithmic form in the log wage equation separately: 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߠଵln ଵܲ௝ ൅ ߠଶln ଶܲ௝ ൅ ߛ ௝ܼ ൅ ߝ௜௝.     (9) 
Examining housing prices separately from non-housing prices is interesting for several reasons.  
For one, it allows us to test if the prediction of equation (4) holds for housing and non-housing 
prices separately. Additionally, a large literature in urban and regional economics following 
Roback (1982) ranks the quality of life across cities using implicit prices of amenities computed 
as the sum of compensating differentials in housing and labor markets, ݀ ଵܲ/ܼ݀ െ ܹ݀/ܼ.  Few 
of these studies incorporate non-housing prices (Gabriel et al. 2003; Shapiro 2006; Albouy 
2008b are recent exceptions).  The justification for this exclusion is often that non-housing prices 
are relatively unimportant (Beeson and Eberts 1989).  The non-trivial variation in non-housing 
prices illustrated in Table 1 combined with the large budget share for non-housing consumption, 
however, suggests that non-housing prices may be quite important.  The few papers that do 
incorporate non-housing prices often do so in a less than ideal way.23  Separating housing and 
non-housing prices allows us to examine the importance of each in explaining interarea wage 
differentials. 
Theory and previous empirical evidence predict that amenities also affect both wages and 
local prices.  Therefore, the regressions also include a number of different amenities from several 
sources found to be important in previous literature.24  A list of variables and data sources is 
included in Appendix Table C.  Without including amenities, the estimated relationship between 
                                                            
23 For example, both Shapiro (2006) and Albouy (2008b) infer non-housing prices from housing prices by regressing 
non-housing prices on housing prices using the ACCRA Cost of Living Index.  However, their approach ignores 
differences in non-housing prices across cities that are not correlated with housing prices.  The analysis in this 
dissertation suggests that regressing non-housing prices on division dummies, city size dummies, and amenities in 
addition to housing prices does a much better job of predicting non-housing prices than housing prices alone.    
24 Many of these are reported at the sub-metropolitan level and had to be aggregated to the CBSA/CSA level using 
populations as weights. 
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wages and prices could be biased.25  Data for several natural amenities are obtained from the 
USDA Economic Research Service.  These include the mean January temperature in degrees 
Fahrenheit, mean July temperature, mean hours of January sunlight, mean July relative humidity, 
the percent of land area covered by water, and five indicator variables for topography that range 
from very flat to mountainous.  The flattest land surface is the omitted reference group.  Mean 
annual inches of precipitation and snow are obtained from Cities Ranked and Rated, 2nd Edition.  
Maps were consulted to create indicator variables for whether a city is located on the coast of the 
Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean or Gulf of Mexico.  Data on violent crime and property crime per 
capita were obtained from the Census Bureau’s USA Counties website.26  The mean commuting 
time in minutes for workers in a city was computed using the 2006 ACS microdata.  Two 
measures of air pollution, ozone and particulate matter 2.5, were computed using the EPA 
AirData database.27  The regressions also include eight census division dummies and six city 
population size dummies to account for residual differences in amenities.28  The city size 
dummies should also help control for differences in unobserved worker ability across cities.29  
No specification of amenities is likely to fully capture differences in the quality of life across 
cities, but the hope is that the variables used in this paper do a reasonably good job of controlling 
for differences in the quality of life across cities. 
  
                                                            
25 For example, a pure consumption amenity is likely to drive up housing prices and drive down wages, which would 
bias the wage-price elasticity toward zero. 
26 http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml. 
27 Pollution values were unavailable for several small cities and were imputed based on average values by Census 
division and city size.  Particulate matter was imputed in this manner for 16 cities, and ozone was imputed for 23 
cities.  We tested the potential effect of this imputation by estimating the regressions without pollution variables and 
estimating the regressions with pollution variables but only for cities that had unimputed pollution levels. The main 
results of this paper do not appear to be affected by the imputation of pollution values for these small cities. 
28 The seven city size categories are: 0-199,999; 200,000-299,999; 300,000-499,999; 500,000-999,999; 1,000,000-
1,999,999; 2,000,000-4,999,999; and 5,000,000+. 
29 Glaeser and Maré (2001), Yankow (2006), and Krupka (2008) all find that the nominal city size wage premium 
falls after controlling for individual fixed effects using panel data on workers, suggesting that large cities attract 
more able workers. 
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5. Empirical Results: The Elasticity between Wages and the General Price Level 
 This section presents results of the elasticity between wages and the general price level 
using the baseline price index, the price index modified using quality-adjusted gross rents, and 
the price index modified using quality-adjusted house values.  All regressions include the full list 
of amenities, division dummies, city size dummies, and individual characteristics as explanatory 
variables.  The results for these variables were generally as expected.  Full results for the 
preferred specification are provided in Appendix Table D.30  We begin by estimating the 
regressions using Ordinary Least Squares and then proceed to instrument for prices to account 
for measurement error, which would bias the estimated coefficients toward zero.  All of the price 
index coefficients in this section are statistically different from zero at the 1% level using cluster 
robust standard errors, but the more appropriate null hypothesis is whether or not they are 
different from unity.31  
Ordinary Least Squares 
 We first estimate the wage-price elasticity, ߠ, using the baseline price index via OLS.  
This specification is comparable to that of DuMond et al. (1999), but the equation herein 
contains many more amenities, more recent data, and uses after-tax wages as the dependent 
variable.32  As seen in the first column of Table 2, this specification yields an estimate of ߠ of 
0.314, and the coefficient is statistically different from one at the 1% level.  According to this 
estimate, a one percent increase in the general price level in a city is associated with a 0.31 
percent increase in after-tax wages.  This is also considerably lower than the previous estimate of 
0.46 by DuMond et al. (1999).  This may suggest that the sharp increase in housing values in 
                                                            
30 As discussed in more detail later, the preferred specification is to measure prices by the log of the rent-based price 
index and instrument using log gross rents from the previous year. 
31 Unless otherwise noted, all standard errors in this paper are robust clustered by city. 
32 A more subtle difference is that DuMond et al. (1999) include workers with imputed earnings, which likely biases 
their estimates toward zero. 
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recent years causes the ACCRA index to be a worse measure of the cost of living in 2006 than it 
was between 1985 and 1995, the time period considered by DuMond et al. (1999). 
 
Table 2: OLS Results for Three Price Indices 
  1 2 3 
Log Baseline Index 0.314c 
(0.048)
Log Rent-Based Modified Index 0.760c 
(0.078) 
Log Value-Based Modified Index 0.416c 
(0.049) 
R2 0.494 0.495 0.494 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of hourly wages net of federal income taxes computed from 
the 2006 CPS-ORG files. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
Regressions contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities.  Regressions also include 8 
Census division dummies, 6 city size dummies, January temperature, July temperature, January 
sun, July humidity, the % of land area covered by water, 4 indicators for topography, 3 indicators 
for coastal location, precipitation, snow, violent crime, property crime, ozone, particulate matter 
(2.5), mean commute time, 11 education dummies, a quartic specification for experience, 
dummy variables for whether a worker is female, Black, Asian, Hispanic, Other, married, 
employed part-time, enrolled part-time in school, a member of a union, a naturalized citizen, or a 
non-citizen, 9 occupation dummies, 11 industry dummies, 3 dummies for government 
employment, and 11 month in sample dummies. The Baseline Index refers to the price index 
constructed solely using ACCRA data.  The two modified indices combine housing prices from 
the Census with non-housing prices from ACCRA.  See text for further details. 
c Significantly different from unity at the 1% level. 
 
 
 The baseline index likely does a poor job of measuring differences in prices across cities 
in part because it measures housing prices primarily by house values instead of rents.  Therefore, 
the rent-based modified price index, which measures housing prices solely by gross rents from 
the ACS is likely more appropriate.  Using the rent-based price index, OLS yields an estimated 
wage-price elasticity of 0.760, much higher than for the baseline price index.  This is an 
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important result.  It appears that the wage-price elasticity using the baseline price index is biased 
toward zero in part because of how housing prices are measured.  However, this estimate for the 
rent-based index is still significantly less than one. 
 We also estimate ߠ using the housing value-based modified price index.  Using OLS, the 
estimated coefficient is 0.416 and is significantly less than one.  Interestingly, the coefficient for 
the value-based modified index is greater than that for the baseline index.  This suggests that 
measuring housing prices by values may not be the only source of measurement error in the 
baseline index.33   
Instrumental Variables 
 Even after measuring housing prices by quality-adjusted gross rents from the ACS, the 
price index may still be measured with considerable error.  Housing prices as measured are likely 
subject to some degree of sampling error and non-housing prices measured in the ACCRA Cost 
of Living Index may be subject to a number of sources of measurement error.  Random 
measurement error will bias the coefficient on the log price index toward zero, and including 
variables that are highly correlated with the price index such as amenities, division dummies, and 
city size dummies, may exacerbate measurement error bias.  We next use instrumental variables 
to account for measurement error in the price indices.  We use as instruments the lagged housing 
and non-housing components of the individual price indices.  If measurement error is random, 
then instrumenting for the price index using the previous year’s components should produce 
consistent estimates of ߠ.  If measurement error in the price index is serially correlated, however, 
instrumenting using lagged prices will not produce consistent coefficient estimates.  Tables 3, 4, 
                                                            
33 It may also be the case that housing values are measured with greater error than rents and this leads to greater 
measurement error bias for the value-based modified index than the rent-based index.  Bucks and Pence (2006), 
however, report that homeowner reported housing values are fairly accurate. 
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and 5 present 2SLS results for the baseline price index, the rent-based modified index, and the 
value-based modified index, respectively.  All instruments used are highly significant in the first 
stage regressions, which are reported in the lower half of each table.   
 
Table 3: 2SLS Results for the Baseline Index 
  1 2 3 
Second-Stage Results 
Log Baseline Index, 2006 0.317c 0.437c 0.333c 
(0.051) (0.091) (0.050) 
R2 0.495 0.495 0.495 
        
First-Stage Results 
Log Housing Price Index, 2005 0.395*** 0.353*** 
(0.015) (0.021) 
Log Non-Housing Index, 2005 1.211*** 0.368*** 
(0.159) (0.097) 
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments 0.837 0.370 0.862 
 
Notes: Regressions contain observations on 69,743 workers in 157 cities.  The dependent 
variable and additional regressors are the same as in Table 2.  Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
c Significantly different from unity at the 1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 
1% level in the first-stage regressions. 
 
 
 We first instrument for the baseline price index using the housing price index constructed 
from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index for 2005.34  The results are reported in the first column of 
Table 3.  First, note that the housing price index from the previous year can explain a substantial 
portion of the variation in the baseline index as illustrated by the very high partial R2 of 0.837 for 
                                                            
34 Of the 167 cities in the sample, only 157 are included in the ACCRA Cost of Living Index for 2005.  The other 10 
cities are not included in 2SLS estimates when prices from ACCRA are used as an instrument.  Appendix Table A1 
indicates the 10 cities without ACCRA information for 2005. 
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the first-stage regression.  The coefficient of the log of the baseline price index in the log wage 
equation, however, is virtually identical to the OLS result.  We next instrument for the baseline 
index using non-housing prices for the previous year.  As seen, lagged non-housing prices 
explain less of the variation in the baseline index (though still a considerable amount), but the 
second-stage coefficient does increase somewhat to 0.437.  In the third column of Table 3, we 
include lagged housing and non-housing prices together as instruments yielding a coefficient of 
0.333 in the second-stage regression.  Thus regardless of the instrument(s) used, the estimated 
elasticity between wages and prices is still considerably less than one using the baseline price 
index. 
 
Table 4: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Modified Index 
  1 2 3 
Second-Stage Results 
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006 0.994 0.603c 0.830a 
(0.106) (0.108) (0.091) 
R2 0.494 0.495 0.495 
        
First-Stage Results 
Log Gross Rents, 2005 0.377*** 0.290*** 
(0.024) (0.017) 
Log Non-Housing Index, 2005 0.878*** 0.594*** 
(0.077) (0.047) 
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments 0.657 0.526 0.859 
 
Notes: Regression in column 1 contains observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities, while 
regressions in columns 2 and 3 contain observations on 69,743 workers in 157 cities.  The 
dependent variable and additional regressors are the same as in Table 2.  Standard errors in 
parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
a Significantly different from unity at the 10% level. c Significantly different from unity at the 
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions. 
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 We next use 2SLS for the preferred measure of prices, the rent-based modified price 
index.  While the OLS coefficient estimate for the rent-based price index is much closer to unity 
than the baseline index, it is still significantly less than one.  If random measurement error is 
driving the coefficient away from one, then instrumenting may produce consistent estimates.  We 
first instrument for the log of the rent-based modified price index using quality-adjusted log 
gross rents from the previous year.  As reported in the first column of Table 4, instrumenting in 
this manner yields a coefficient estimate of 0.994 that is nearly identical to one.  Therefore, 
instrumenting for the rent-based price index using rents for the previous year provides empirical 
support for the full compensation hypothesis.  We next instrument for the rent-based modified 
index using non-housing prices for the previous year.  The 2SLS coefficient estimate in this case, 
0.603, is considerably lower than that found using OLS.  Finally, when we use both gross rents 
and non-housing prices as instruments for the rent-based price index, we get a coefficient 
estimate of 0.830 that is statistically different from unity at the 10% level. 
 Non-housing prices are constructed from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index and are likely 
subject to considerable measurement error, some of which is likely persistent within cities over 
time.  If measurement error in non-housing prices is serially correlated, then instrumenting for 
the general price level using non-housing prices will not yield consistent estimates of ߠ.  The 
divergence between the estimates in the first and second columns of Table 4 suggests that this is 
indeed the case.  Quality-adjusted gross rents are estimated from the ACS PUMS and may also 
be subject to some measurement error such as due to sampling.  However, the measurement error 
in log gross rents is much more likely to be classical in nature.  If the measurement error in the 
lag of log gross rents is purely random and uncorrelated with measurement error in the rent-
based price index, then the 2SLS estimates in the first column of Table 4 are consistent.  This 
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seems quite plausible.  If log gross rents are a valid instrument, over-identification in the 
specification of the third column allows us to examine the validity of non-housing prices as an 
instrument.  Doing so, we get a Hansen J Statistic of 11.297, which allows us to reject non-
housing prices as a valid instrument at the 1% level.  Thus the coefficient in the first column of 
Table 4 is the preferred estimate of the elasticity between wages and the general price level.   
 
Table 5: 2SLS Results for the Value-Based Modified Index 
  1 2 3 
Second-Stage Results 
Log Value-Based Modified Index, 2006 0.478c 0.395c 0.447c 
(0.059) (0.071) (0.052) 
R2 0.494 0.495 0.495 
        
First-Stage Results 
Log Housing Values, 2005 0.347*** 0.294*** 
(0.015) (0.017) 
Log Non-Housing Index, 2005 1.340*** 0.552*** 
(0.138) (0.077) 
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments 0.835 0.481 0.899 
 
Notes: Regression in column 1 contains observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities, while 
regressions in columns 2 and 3 contain observations on 69,743 workers in 157 cities.  The 
dependent variable and additional regressors are the same as in Table 2.  Standard errors in 
parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
c Significantly different from unity at the 1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 
1% level in the first-stage regressions. 
 
 
 For the sake of comparison, we also estimate the wage-price elasticity for the value-based 
modified price index using 2SLS.  The results are presented in Table 5.  In all three columns, the 
coefficient on the value-based price index is considerably less than one, again suggesting that 
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measuring housing prices by housing values is inappropriate.  Interestingly, though, the estimates 
in the first and third columns are a little higher than the corresponding estimates for the baseline 
index in Table 3, while the estimate in the second column that instruments for the general price 
level using non-housing prices is lower than in Table 3.   
 A recap of the results in this section is warranted.  Theory and intuition predict that the 
elasticity between wages and the general price level should be close to one.  When housing 
prices are measured by homeowner values, the estimated elasticity between wages and the 
general price level is never more than 0.5, even when we use instrumental variables to account 
for measurement error.  When housing prices are measured by rents, though, the estimated 
elasticity between wages and the general price level increases considerably.  Using OLS the 
estimated wage-price elasticity is still less than one, but instrumenting for the log of the rent-
based modified price index using the log of quality-adjusted gross rents for the previous year, the 
wage-price elasticity is equal to one for all practical purposes.  This result supports the full 
compensation hypothesis and has important implications for researchers estimating the implicit 
prices of amenities.  In the next section, we examine the sensitivity of ߠ to alternative 
specifications. 
 
6. The Elasticity between Wages and the General Price Level for Alternative Specifications 
 In this section, we briefly examine the sensitivity of the 2SLS wage-price elasticity 
estimates using the rent-based price index to alternative specifications and samples.  The results 
prove to be quite robust.  The first row of Table 6 reproduces estimates for the preferred 
specification from the first column of Table 4 in which we instrument for the log of the rent-
based price index using log gross rents from the previous year.  The remainder of Tables 6, 7, 
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and 8 present results for alternative specifications and samples instrumenting for the log of the 
rent-based priced index using log gross rents. 
 
Table 6: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Index under Alternative Specifications 
  Coefficient Standard Error 
(1)   Preferred Specification 0.994 0.106 
(2)   Including Imputed Earners   0.697c 0.072 
(3)   Pre-Tax Wages 1.062 0.114 
(4)   Including State Fixed Effects 0.949 0.110 
(5)   Renters Only 1.037 0.128 
(6)   Homeowners Only 1.011 0.122 
(7)   1990 Data 0.967 0.111 
 
Notes: Results in rows 1-6 are from 2SLS regressions for the log of the rent-based price index 
using log gross rents for 2005 as an instrument. Results in row 7 are from 2SLS regressions 
using 1990 data with log gross rents in 1990 as an instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.  See text for further details. 
c Significantly different from unity at the 1% level. 
 
Including Individuals with Imputed Earnings 
 The analysis thus far has excluded workers with imputed earnings to avoid imputation 
bias.  Including imputed earners would likely result in imputation bias because imputed earners in the 
CPS are often assigned wages of workers in different metropolitan areas or even different regions 
(Hirsch and Schumacher 2004).  The second row of Table 6 reports results of the wage-price 
elasticity estimated with workers with imputed earnings included in the sample.  Including 
imputed earners increases the sample size to 108,597 meaning that 34 percent of the workers in 
this specification have imputed earnings.  The effect of imputation bias on the wage-price 
elasticity is quite severe.  With imputed earners included, the wage-price elasticity falls to 0.697 
and is statistically different from unity at the one percent level.  The attenuation in the coefficient 
(30 percent) is nearly one to one with the percent of workers with imputed earnings.  This 
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reaffirms the initial decision to exclude workers with imputed earnings as suggested by recent 
literature.  
Pre-tax Wages 
 In the third row of Table 6, we estimate ߠ via 2SLS using pre-tax wages as the dependent 
variable.  As pointed out by Henderson (1982) and Albouy (2008a,b), the progressivity of the 
federal income tax causes workers in cities with high nominal wages to pay a higher percentage 
of their income in federal income taxes than workers in cities with lower nominal wages.  For the 
utility of homogenous workers to be constant across areas, pre-tax wages should be more 
dispersed across areas than after-tax wages.  In other words, workers in high wage areas must be 
compensated for the higher federal income taxes they pay in addition to the compensation they 
require for the higher cost of living or worse bundle of amenities.  As such, the estimated wage-
price elasticity should be higher using pre-tax wages than using after-tax wages.  The results in 
row 3 suggest that this is likely the case.  The estimate of ߠ increases to 1.062, but is not 
statistically different from unity.  We maintain, however, that it is after-tax wages that should 
equalize across areas controlling for prices, amenities, and individual characteristics, so 
measuring wages net of federal income tax provides a better test of the theory than measuring 
wages before federal income tax. 
State Fixed Effects 
 If wages should be measured net of federal income tax, we might also consider adjusting 
wages for state and local income taxes.  Income taxes, however, are only part of the story at the 
states and local level.  To adjust wages for state and local income taxes, we would also need to 
incorporate information on other state and local taxes and state and local public spending.  To 
avoid the many complexities involved with adjusting wages for state and local taxes and 
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expenditures, we adopt a different approach by examining the robustness of the results to 
including state fixed effects.  If ignoring state taxes and expenditures is biasing the previous 
results, then we would expect that including state fixed effects would produce a very different 
estimate of ߠ than the case in which we include census division fixed effects.  As seen in row 4, 
including state fixed effects reduces the coefficient estimate to 0.949, but it is not statistically 
different from one.  Therefore, the basic findings of this paper are robust to including state fixed 
effects.  The preferred specification, however, is to use census division dummies and not state 
fixed effects because several states contain only one city in the sample.  Including state fixed 
effects means that ߠ is only estimated based on states that have more than one city in the sample.    
Renters vs. Homeowners 
   One might also wonder if using a rent-based price index yields different estimates of ߠ 
for renters and homeowners.  In particular, one might be concerned that the rent-based price 
index does not accurately measure the prices faced by homeowners and could cause ߠ estimates 
for the two groups to diverge.  Rows 5 and 6 of Table 6 estimate ߠ separately for renters and 
homeowners.   The coefficient estimate for renters is 1.037, and the estimate for homeowners is 
1.011.  Therefore, the coefficient estimates for renters and homeowners separately are slightly 
higher than the pooled estimate, but neither estimate is statistically different from unity.  The 
coefficient estimates for renters and homeowners are also not statistically different from each 
other.  It appears that differences in prices across cities affect the wages of renters and 
homeowners roughly the same. 
An Earlier Period: 1990 
 To ensure that the results are not being driven by the particular year chosen, we next 
reestimate the wage-price elasticity using 1990 data from the CPS, the ACCRA Cost of Living 
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Index, Census microdata, and the various sources of information on amenities, constructing 
prices and amenities as before.35  The 1990 sample contains 84,117 observations in 155 cities.  
The preferred instrument would be to use log gross rents from the previous year, but 
unfortunately the most recent prior year would be 1980.  Instead of using housing prices from 
such a distant earlier period, we use log gross rents from 1990.  If measurement error in the log 
of the rent-based price index is correlated with measurement error in log gross rents, coefficient 
estimates from this procedure will be downwardly biased.  However, because gross rents from 
the Census are expected to be measured with relatively little error, downward bias due to 
measurement error is likely to be minimal.  Row 7 of Table 6 presents the wage-price elasticity 
estimate using data for 1990.  The estimate is 0.967 and not statistically different from unity.  
Thus it appears that the finding of a wage-price elasticity of unity for the rent-based price index 
is robust to this earlier period chosen.36   
By Educational Attainment 
 We may also be concerned that using a single price index ignores differences in prices 
within cities for different standards of living.  Workers do not care about the average price level 
in a city, but instead care about the prices of goods that they consume.  If the relative cost of 
living in a city varies significantly across different types of workers, estimating θ using a single 
price index for all workers may be inappropriate.  This concern motivated Roback (1988) to use 
separate price indices for workers with different standards of living. 
                                                            
35 One subtle difference in the price index is that the shares of housing and non-housing goods in the rent-based 
price index are different than in 2006.  While gross rents represented 29 percent of total household expenditures in 
the 2005 CES, the share was only 24 percent for the 1990 CES.  Therefore, the 1990 rent-based price index gives 
housing prices based on Census microdata a weight of 0.24 and non-housing prices from ACCRA a weight of 0.76. 
36 We also estimate the wage-price elasticity for 1990 using a value-based modified index similar to that used above.  
Using 2SLS with log housing values as an instrument, we find a wage-price elasticity for this price index of 0.579 
that is statistically different from one.  While this estimate is higher than the corresponding estimate of 0.478 in the 
first column of Table 5 and would likely be even higher in the absence of measurement error, it is still quite a bit 
less than unity.  This again reaffirms the earlier finding that housing values are an inappropriate measure of the price 
of housing consumption.   
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To explore the importance of price differences across standards of living, we form 
separate rent-based price indices for four educational groups: high school dropouts, high school 
graduates, persons with some college, and persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher.  Non-
housing prices are taken to be the same for all four groups, but housing prices are allowed to 
vary by income group in a similar method to that used by Moretti (2008).  First, the rent 
regression of equation (8) is estimated separately for each education group.  The estimated 
parameters are then used to predict quality-adjusted average gross rents for each city and 
education group holding the housing characteristics constant at their mean level for the education 
group.  Quality-adjusted gross rents for each education level are then combined with non-
housing prices to form separate rent-based modified price indices for the four education groups 
with non-housing prices given a weight of 0.71 and housing prices given a weight of 0.29 as 
before.   
Because there are now four different price indices, we estimate the wage-price elasticity 
via equation (7) separately for each education group using their education-specific price index.  
Before doing so, however, it is useful to first estimate the wage-price elasticity separately for 
each education group using the rent-based index used above that does not vary by education.  In 
other words, we wish to see if the wage-price elasticity varies by education group using the same 
rent-based price index for all education groups.  To do so, we instrument for the log of the 
general price level using log gross rents from the previous year.  The results in the upper panel of 
Table 7 suggest that the wage-price elasticity does indeed vary by education group and is 
decreasing with education.  DuMond et al. (1999) also find the wage-price elasticity to be 
generally decreasing with education, though their estimates were less than unity for all four 
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Table 7: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Index by Education Group 
  1 2 3 4 
  
High 
School 
Dropout 
High 
School 
Graduate 
Some      
College 
College 
Graduate 
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006 1.439c 1.157 0.946 0.673b 
(0.156) (0.129) (0.141) (0.150) 
          
Education Group-Specific Log Rent-
Based Modified Index, 2006 1.426b 1.192 1.038 0.742a 
(0.184) (0.142) (0.158) (0.140) 
          
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006 
Omitting Mean Commute Time 1.320b 1.017 1.005 0.939 
(0.136) (0.122) (0.117) (0.123) 
Observations 6,595 19,018 20,236 25,856 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
a Significantly different from unity at the 10% level. b Significantly different from unity at the 
5% level. c Significantly different from unity at the 1% level. 
 
 
education groups.37  Instrumenting for the log of the general price level using log gross rents 
from the previous year, we estimate θ for high school dropouts, high school graduates, those with 
some college, and college graduates to equal 1.44, 1.16, 0.95, and 0.67, respectively.  The 
estimates for high school graduates and those with some college are not statistically different 
from one, but the estimates for high school dropouts and college graduates are statistically 
different from one.  These estimates suggest that workers with low education are 
overcompensated for difference in prices across cities, but workers with college degrees are 
undercompensated for differences in prices.  DuMond et al. suggest that θ may decrease with 
                                                            
37 DuMond et al. (1999) estimate θ for the four education groups to equal 0.49, 0.45, 0.48, and 0.39. 
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education because educated workers are better able to shift away from housing in areas where 
housing is relatively expensive.  Similarly, we might also expect θ to decrease with education if 
housing is a more important share of consumption for less educated workers.38   
It could also be the case that using average prices for all workers adversely affects the 
estimates.  Thus, using the education-specific price indices could yield estimates close to unity 
for all groups.  When we estimate equation (7) separately for each education group using the 
education-specific price indices, however, the results are not significantly affected as seen in the 
middle portion of Table 7.  The estimates of θ for the four education groups are 1.43, 1.19, 1.04, 
and 0.74.  In other words, while there may be differences in the wage-price elasticity by 
education group, differences in the price of housing by education group do not appear to be an 
important part of the explanation.   
The estimated wage-price elasticity may also differ across education groups because 
coefficient estimates for other variables vary by education group.  Examining the coefficient 
estimates for the other variables, one sticks out as particularly troubling.  According to the 
estimates, mean commute time has a very different effect on the wages of workers in different 
education groups.  For the regressions in the upper portion of Table 7, the coefficients for mean 
commute time are -0.52, -0.64, 0.27, and 1.12, though only the estimates for high school 
graduates and college graduates are statistically different from zero.39  Our expectation is that 
longer commutes in a city should be a disamenity and we expect commute time to have a 
positive sign.  However, collinearity between the price index and commute time may be 
                                                            
38 This would result because understating housing’s share of consumption would cause the composite price index to 
be under-dispersed.  Under-dispersion in the price index would cause the estimated wage-price elasticity to be too 
large. 
39 The coefficient for mean commute time in the preferred specification in the first column of Table 4 is 0.12 and not 
statistically different from zero. 
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influencing the estimates of both.  As the coefficient for commute time increases, the coefficient 
for the price index decreases and vice versa.   
Therefore, the coefficient on the rent-based price index may differ across education 
groups in part because of the differing coefficient on commute time.  To explore this further, we 
estimate the wage-price elasticity using the single rent-based price index separately for each 
education group excluding commute time from the regression equation.40  The results are 
presented in the lower portion of Table 7.  Excluding commute time, the education-group 
specific estimates of θ become 1.32, 1.02, 1.00, and 0.94 with only the estimates for high school 
dropouts being statistically different from one.  Thus while high school dropouts may be more 
than fully compensated for prices using the price index as constructed, those with a high school 
degree or higher appear to be fully compensated for differences in prices across areas. 
Spatial Autocorrelation 
 Another potential concern with the preferred specification in the first column of Table 4 
is that it does not account for potential spatial autocorrelation.  The spatial equilibrium 
hypothesis, however, predicts that the utility of homogeneous workers will be equal across all 
areas.  In other words, the spatial equilibrium hypothesis suggests that if we properly control for 
prices and amenities, wages should not be spatially dependent because workers will relocate to 
arbitrage utility differences across space.  If, however, we have not properly controlled for prices 
and amenities, wages may be spatially auto-correlated because of similarities in these variables 
in nearby areas.  Similarly, if prices and amenities are misspecified, the wage equation error term 
in a city may be spatially correlated with the error terms of nearby cities.  Failing to account for 
spatial correlation in the dependent variable could cause regression coefficients to be 
                                                            
40 Excluding mean commute time from the preferred specification in the first column of Table 4 results in a wage-
price elasticity of 1.02 that is not statistically different from zero. 
39 
 
 
 
inconsistently estimated and failing to account for spatial error correlation could lead to 
inconsistently estimated standard errors (Anselin, 1988). 
 In this subsection we consider the sensitivity of the wage-price elasticity to allowing for 
spatial correlation in the dependent variable and in the error term.  To do so, we first estimate 
quality-adjusted average log wages for each city in the sample by regressing log wages on 
worker characteristics (ܺ) and city fixed effects (ߜ): 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߜ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝.        (10) 
The city fixed effects are then used as the dependent variable in the spatial equations.  In matrix 
notation, the general spatial model can be represented by:   
 ߜ ൌ ߩܯߜ ൅ ߠlnܲ ൅ ߛܼ ൅ ߱        (11)
 ߱ ൌ ߣܯ߱ ൅ ߞ,          
where ܯ is an ݊ ൈ ݊ weighting matrix that specifies the structure of the spatial correlation, ߩ and 
ߣ are spatial autocorrelation coefficients for the dependent variable and the error term, 
respectively, and ߞ is a mean zero error term that is i.i.d. across observations.  The model in 
equation (11) allows for spatial correlation in both the dependent variable and in the error term, 
but we could restrict the spatial structure to allow for spatial correlation in only one of the two.  
We can set ߣ ൌ 0 and estimate what is commonly referred to as the spatial lag model.  
Alternatively, we can set ߩ ൌ 0 and estimate what is commonly referred to as the spatial error 
model.  For the sake of completeness, we estimate the spatial lag model, the spatial error model, 
and the general spatial model that allows for spatial correlation in both the dependent variable 
and the error term.   
 For the results reported in this paper, we specify ܯ as a row-standardized “contiguity” 
matrix by defining all metropolitan areas within 400 miles of each other as neighbors, though the 
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results are qualitatively robust to several alternative specifications.41  In other words, ܯ places 
equal weight on all metropolitan areas within 400 miles of metropolitan area ݆ with the diagonal 
elements of ܯ all equal to zero to prevent ݆ from being its own neighbor.  Because the rows of ܯ 
are standardized to sum to one, ܯߜ is simply a vector of the average of wage fixed effects in 
nearby cities.  Equation (11) hypothesizes that wages are simultaneously determined (wages in 
city j affect wages in city i, and wages in i also affect wages in j), so using OLS to estimate the 
spatial model is inappropriate.  The present paper estimates the spatial models by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) 
using the Spatial Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB developed by James LeSage (1999).  The 
GMM estimator instruments for wages in nearby cities using the averages of the other 
explanatory variables (prices and amenities) in nearby cities. 
 
Table 8: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Index with Spatial Lag and Spatial Error 
  1 2 3 4 
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006 1.062 1.038 1.042 1.039 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.124) (0.140) 
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.346 0.209 
(0.233) (0.274) 
Spatial Error (λ) 0.462 0.471 
       (0.514) (0.763) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the quality-adjusted average log wages for each city for 2006.  
See the text for further details. 
 
 
                                                            
41 The current paper chooses a cutoff of 400 miles in part to minimize the average number of neighbors while 
ensuring that all cities have at least one neighbor.  The distance cutoff of 400 miles was also recently used by 
McMillen, Singell, and Waddell (2007) in examining the spatial dependence in college tuition setting on the grounds 
that it approximates the distance of a 1-day drive.  Again, the results are qualitatively robust to increasing the cutoff 
beyond 400 miles. 
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 The results are presented in Table 8.  The first column reports 2SLS results of (11) 
assuming that both ߣ ൌ 0 and ߩ ൌ 0.42  This specification essentially differs from the preferred 
specification in the first column of Table 4 only in that the city is the level of observation and 
each city is given equal weight in Table 8, while in Table 4 the worker was the level of 
observation and larger cities were given more weight because they had more workers.  The 
coefficient on the log of the rent-based price index of 1.062 in the first column is slightly larger 
than one, but the difference is not statistically significant.  In the second column, we estimate the 
spatial lag model that allows for spatial correlation in the dependent variable, but not in the error 
term.  The wage-price elasticity is 1.038 and not statistically different from unity, and the spatial 
lag term is not statistically different from zero.  In the third column, we estimate the spatial error 
model, which allows for spatial correlation in the errors but not in the dependent variable.  The 
wage-price elasticity is 1.042 and not statistically different from one and the spatial error 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  In the fourth column, we estimate the general 
spatial model that allows for spatial error correlation in both the dependent variable and the error 
term.  The wage-price elasticity is 1.039 and not statistically different from one, and the 
coefficients for the spatial lag and spatial error are again not statistically different from zero.  
The results in Table 8, therefore, suggest that wages are not correlated across cities after 
controlling for prices and amenities.  Consequently, the wage-price elasticity estimate of about 
unity is robust to controlling for the possibility of spatial autocorrelation. 
 
7. Empirical Results: The Elasticity between Wages and Housing and Non-Housing Prices 
 We next separate the price index into housing and non-housing prices and include them 
in the wage equation separately.  Equation (4) predicts that the wage-price elasticity for a good 
                                                            
42 Throughout this subsection the log of the rent-based price index is instrumented using log gross rents from 2005. 
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should be approximately equal to the share of wage income spent on the good.  We wish to 
explore the validity of this hypothesis for both housing and non-housing prices.  Assuming after 
tax wage income is roughly equal to consumption, the expenditure share for a good should be 
roughly equal to the share of wage income spent on it.  Therefore, using expenditure shares 
computed from the 2005 CES, the expected coefficient for housing is about 0.29 and the 
expected coefficient for non-housing is roughly 0.71.   
 
 
Table 9: Separating Housing Prices (Rents) and Non-housing Prices 
  1 2 3 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Full Adjustment for: N/A Non-housing Prices Housing Prices 
Log Gross Rents 0.337 0.297 
(0.038) (0.042) 
Log Non-housing Price Index 0.231c 0.754 
(0.106) (0.289) 
R2 0.495 0.483 0.482 
        
First-Stage Results 
Log Gross Rents, 2005 0.934*** 0.138*** 
(0.032) (0.029) 
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments   0.863 0.141 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of after-tax hourly wages.  In column 2 
wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices, i.e. the coefficient on log non-housing prices is 
constrained to equal 0.71.  In column 3 wages are fully adjusted for housing prices measured by 
gross rents, i.e. the coefficient on log gross rents is constrained to equal 0.29.  All regressions 
contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities.  The additional regressors are the same as 
in Table 2.  Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
c Significantly different from the budget share (0.29 for housing and 0.71 for non-housing) at the 
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions. 
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 We first estimate the log wage equation with log gross rents and log non-housing prices 
included simultaneously via OLS.  As discussed above, measurement error in prices may bias 
coefficients toward zero.  Alternatively, if non-housing prices are measured with considerable 
error, while housing prices are measured with relatively little error, the coefficient on housing 
prices could be biased upward.  Measurement error would bias the coefficient on non-housing 
prices toward zero, and the downward bias in the coefficient for non-housing prices would cause 
the coefficient on housing prices to be positively biased because of a partially omitted variable.  
In other words, housing prices could pick up some of the effect of non-housing prices.  This is 
especially problematic given the very high correlation between log gross rents and log non-
housing prices; the raw correlation coefficient between the two is 0.718.  The results in column 1 
of Table 9 suggest that log gross rents may indeed be picking up some of the effect of log non-
housing prices.  The coefficient on log gross rents is 0.337, and is statistically different from zero 
at the 1% level but not statistically different from the budget share of 0.29.   The coefficient on 
log non-housing prices is 0.231, and is statistically different from zero at the 5% level and 
statistically different from the budget share of 0.71 at the 1% level. 
 Ideally, we would like to simultaneously instrument for housing and non-housing prices 
to account for measurement error in both.  One possibility would be to use lagged values of both 
as instruments.  However, because measurement error in non-housing prices is likely to be 
serially correlated, instrumenting for non-housing prices using its lagged value will not yield 
consistent estimates.  Instead, we explore estimating the log housing price and log non-housing 
price coefficients separately while constraining the other to equal its budget share and 
instrumenting using log gross rents for the previous year.  This is a hybrid between full 
adjustment and partial adjustment for prices used by previous researchers.  Constraining one of 
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the coefficients to be different from its true value, however, will likely bias the other in the 
opposite direction.  First stage results at the bottom of Table 5 confirm that the log of gross rents 
from the previous year is a significant predictor of both log gross rents and log non-housing 
prices. 
 In column 2 of Table 9, wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices by constraining 
the coefficient on log non-housing prices to equal 0.71, i.e., we estimate: 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ െ .71 כ ln ଶܲ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߠଵln ଵܲ௝ ൅ ߛ ௝ܼ ൅ ߝ௜௝.     (12) 
The coefficient on log gross rents is estimated by 2SLS using log gross rents for the previous 
year as an instrument.  As seen, the coefficient on log gross rents falls to 0.297 and is not 
statistically different from 0.29.  In other words, when we fully adjust wages for non-housing 
prices, the elasticity between wages and housing prices (measured by gross rents) is nearly 
identical to housing’s budget share as predicted by theory.   
 In column 3 of Table 9, wages are fully adjusted for housing prices by constraining the 
coefficient on log gross rents to equal 0.29: 
 ln ௜ܹ௝ െ .29 כ ln ଵܲ௝ ൌ ௜ܺ௝ߚ ൅ ߠଶln ଶܲ௝ ൅ ߛ ௝ܼ ൅ ߝ௜௝.     (13) 
The coefficient for log non-housing prices is estimated by 2SLS using log gross rents for the 
previous year as an instrument.  Obviously, if the true value of ߠଵ is greater than 0.29, the 
estimate for ߠଶ will be upwardly biased.  That said, the coefficient on log non-housing prices is 
0.754 and is not statistically different from 0.71.  The 2SLS results in Table 9, therefore, suggest 
that the prediction of equation (4), that the wage-price elasticity for a good is equal to its budget 
share, holds for housing and non-housing prices separately. 
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Table 10: Separating Housing Prices (Values) and Non-housing Prices 
  1 2 3 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Full Adjustment for: NA Non-housing Prices Housing Prices 
Log Housing Values 0.143c 0.091 c 
(0.024) (0.021) 
Log Non-housing Price Index 0.165 c -0.641 c 
(0.132) (0.226) 
R2 0.494 0.482 0.484 
        
First-Stage Results 
Log Housing Values, 2005 0.992*** 0.097*** 
(0.024) (0.015) 
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments   0.949 0.281 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of after-tax hourly wages.  In column 2 
wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices, i.e. the coefficient on log non-housing prices is 
constrained to equal 0.77.  In column 3 wages are fully adjusted for housing prices measured by 
housing values, i.e. the coefficient on log housing values is constrained to equal 0.23.  All 
regressions contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities.  The additional regressors are 
the same as in Table 2.  Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. 
c Significantly different from the budget share (0.23 for housing and 0.77 for non-housing) at the 
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions. 
 
 
 In Table 10, we reestimate the regressions in Table 9 using quality-adjusted housing 
values rather than rents to measure housing prices.43  When we do so, the coefficients on log 
housing and log non-housing prices are always significantly less than their budget shares.  In 
fact, when we fully adjust wages for housing prices measured by housing values in column 3 of 
Table 10, the log of the non-housing price index has a significantly negative coefficient.  This 
reinforces results in the previous section suggesting that housing values are an inappropriate 
measure of housing prices.   
                                                            
43 The expected shares for housing and non-housing now change to 0.23 and 0.77 because housing values do not 
include utilities and non-housing prices now do. 
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8. Implications for Estimating Implicit Prices of Amenities 
 The empirical results in this paper have important implications for researchers interested 
in estimating the implicit prices of amenities or ranking the quality of life across cities.  The 
relationship between wages and prices is consistent with the full compensation hypothesis when 
we measure housing prices by rents and use lagged rents as an instrument for the general price 
level.  When we measure housing prices by values, however, the relationship between wages and 
prices is highly inconsistent with the full compensation hypothesis, even when using 
instrumental variables.  This suggests that using housing values along with wages to infer 
implicit prices of amenities is likely to produce biased estimates.  To illustrate, we estimate 
Census division amenity values by regressing log after-tax wages fully adjusted by both the rent-
based modified price index and the baseline price index on eight Census division dummy 
variables.  These regressions contain individual worker characteristics but no city level controls 
other than Census division indicators.  The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
11.44  The implicit price of a division’s amenities is measured as the negative of its division 
dummy coefficient for fully adjusted wages.  In other words, a low division coefficient indicates 
a high value of amenities.   
 If the true wage-price elasticity is equal to one and the rent-based modified index 
measures the general price level across cities without systematic error (but potentially random 
error), then the estimates of amenity values by division in column 1 are consistently estimated.45  
The estimates in column 1 suggest that the Middle Atlantic, Pacific, and New England (the 
                                                            
44 We also regressed the log of the rent-based modified index on log gross rents, amenities, region dummies, and 
city size dummies to obtain predicted values that “net out” potential measurement error.  Division dummies 
estimated for wages fully adjusted using the predicted values of the rent-based modified priced index were nearly 
identical to those in column 1 using the actual values. 
45 The previous two sections argue that there is systematic measurement error within cities over time in non-housing 
prices.  This measurement error, however, can still be unsystematic across cities for a given time period.   
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omitted category) divisions have the most highly valued bundles of amenities.  A coefficient of 
0.065 for the West South Central division suggests that a marginal worker will require a 6.5 
percent higher “real wage” to live in the West South Central division than in New England to 
compensate for the worse bundle of amenities.   
 
Table 11: Amenity Values by Census Division 
Wages Fully Adjusted Using:  Rent-based Modified 
Price Index  
Baseline 
Price Index 
Gross Rents 
Only   
Middle Atlantic -0.017 -0.044 -0.020 
(0.019) (0.042) (0.020) 
East North Central 0.075*** 0.128*** -0.019 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) 
West North Central 0.070*** 0.160*** -0.038** 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.018) 
South Atlantic 0.041** 0.112*** -0.033 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020) 
East South Central 0.059*** 0.132*** -0.045*** 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.014) 
West South Central 0.065*** 0.203*** -0.054*** 
(0.020) (0.032) (0.016) 
Mountain 0.072*** 0.159*** -0.018 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.015) 
Pacific -0.004 -0.036 -0.003 
  (0.022) (0.041) (0.020) 
 
Notes: Regressions contain detailed individual characteristics as in Table 2, but no city-level 
variables other than Census division dummies. New England is the reference group. Standard 
errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.  
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. 
 
 
 Fully adjusting wages using the baseline index, however, may upwardly bias estimates of 
amenity values in areas with high values of the index and downwardly bias estimates of amenity 
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values in areas with low values of the index.  This result follows because housing values are 
more dispersed than rents across cities, but rents measure the true user cost of housing.  The rank 
ordering of division dummies in column 2 is similar to that in column 1, but the estimated 
coefficients are much larger.  According to wages fully adjusted using the baseline index, a 
marginal worker will require a more than 20 percent higher “real wage” to live in the West South 
Central than in New England.  However, because the baseline index measures housing prices 
primarily by housing values, the estimated amenity prices in column 2 are biased. 
 This paper also has implications for researchers who neglect to include non-housing 
prices in measuring the implicit price of amenities.46  Column 3 of Table 11 reports the results of 
division dummies for log wages fully adjusted for gross rents (assuming a budget share of 0.29) 
but not non-housing prices.  The ranking of the coefficients is nearly the opposite of that in 
column 1.  The West South Central is now the most amenable and the New England and Pacific 
divisions are now the worst.  These results confirm that ignoring non-housing prices downwardly 
biases amenity values for areas with high non-housing prices and upwardly biases amenity prices 
for areas with low non-housing prices.47 
 
9. Conclusion 
 Differences in wages across areas can be partially explained by differences in prices and 
amenities.  For a given price level, workers are willing to accept lower wages to live and work in 
more amenable locations.  Controlling for amenities, wages must be higher in high price areas in 
order for workers to achieve equal utility across locations.  This paper presents a simple model 
                                                            
46 Researchers including Gabriel et al. (2003), Shapiro (2006) and Albouy (2008b) have begun to incorporate non-
housing prices in amenity prices, but this was not generally the case until recently. 
47 Interestingly, though, the biases from measuring housing prices by housing values and ignoring non-housing 
prices are in opposite direction.  As a result, measuring housing prices by values and ignoring non-housing prices 
produces amenity estimates generally between those in column 2 and column 3. 
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that predicts that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the price of a good is proportional to 
the share of wage income spent on the good.  The model also suggests that if workers’ 
consumption equals their wage income, then the elasticity between wages and the general price 
level should equal one.  However, to the extent that the assumptions of the model do not hold, 
the actual relationship between wages and prices may differ from that predicted by the model. 
 Measuring housing prices by rents, we find that the elasticity between wages and the 
general price level is nearly identical to one after instrumenting for the general price level using 
rents for the previous year.  We also present evidence that the wage-price elasticities for housing 
and non-housing prices are equal to their budget shares when housing prices are measured by 
rents.  These results provide empirical evidence in support of the full compensation hypothesis. 
 Importantly, though, when housing prices are measured by housing values, the elasticity 
between wages and the general price level is less than 0.5.  The findings in this paper have 
important implications for estimating the implicit prices of amenities.  Measuring housing prices 
by values instead of rents will bias estimates and cause cities with high housing values to have 
the relative value of their amenities overstated. 
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ESSAY II: TEACHER SALARIES AND TEACHER UNIONS: A SPATIAL 
ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
 
1. Introduction 
Teacher pay is an issue that has received much attention from researchers, politicians, 
and the general public.  Teacher pay is important for several reasons.  For one, state and local 
governments spend a large portion of their budgets on education.  For the 2005-06 school year, 
public school districts in the U.S. had current expenditures per pupil of $9,138, with more than 
60 percent of current expenditures going toward teacher salaries and benefits.48  Teacher pay is 
also important because of the sheer number of public school teachers in the U.S.  In 2006, full-
time equivalent employment of elementary and secondary teachers by state and local 
governments was more than 4.6 million, making teachers by far the largest group of state and 
local government employees.49  Teacher pay is also likely to affect the ability of school districts 
to recruit and retain quality teachers as suggested by a sizable literature in education finance 
(e.g., Murnane and Olsen 1989, 1990; Figlio 1997, 2002; Clotfelter et al. 2008)   
 In this paper, we use a spatial econometric framework to examine the effects of teacher 
unions and other school district characteristics on teacher salaries.  While a large literature has 
investigated the determinants of teacher salaries, only a handful of these studies have used spatial 
econometric methods to account for spatial dependence in teacher salaries.  The few studies that 
do so provide analysis of individual states and give little attention to the effects of unions.  To 
the researcher’s knowledge, this paper is the first to examine teacher salaries in a spatial 
econometric framework for the 48 contiguous U.S. states.
                                                            
48 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division 
49 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division 
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Unions are also likely to affect school districts in ways other than increasing teacher 
salaries.  For one, unions are likely to affect the level of fringe benefits that teachers receive as 
part of their compensation package.  Unions are likely to work toward better health insurance 
benefits, better pension benefits, and greater job security for the teachers they represent.  Unions 
may also affect other school district characteristics such as the student-teacher ratio and the level 
and composition of non-instructional expenditures.  Perhaps most importantly, the overall 
influence of unions may affect the amount that students learn through altering inputs into the 
production of education and by empowering teachers.50  The current paper, however, focuses on 
the effect of unions on the salaries that teachers are paid.  Additional effects that unions might 
have on school districts are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The results in this paper confirm that teacher salaries are positively affected by salaries in 
nearby districts even after controlling for several other variables that explain teacher salaries.  
We find that a one percent increase in the average salary of experienced teachers in nearby 
districts increases salaries for experienced teachers in a given district by between 0.51 and 0.68 
percent.  For beginning teachers the effect of salaries in nearby districts is even stronger with 
estimates between 0.85 and 0.92 percent.  Furthermore, accounting for spatial dependence 
produces estimates for several variables that differ considerably from models that ignore the 
spatial relationship.  Incorporating union spillovers at the state level, we find that collective 
bargaining and union membership density increase the salaries of experienced teachers by as 
much as 16 and 21 percent, respectively, but the estimated effects on the salaries of beginning 
teachers are much smaller.  This result is consistent with predictions from a median voter model. 
                                                            
50 The overall effect of unions on learning is unclear a priori.  For example, unions may increase the level of inputs, 
but decrease the efficiency with which those inputs are used.  Hoxby (1996) finds that unions have a negative 
overall effect on student performance.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews the 
literature on teacher salaries, paying specific attention to studies that focus on the effects of 
unions and studies that examine teacher salaries using a spatial econometric framework.  Section 
3 presents the empirical model, and section 4 discusses data.  Empirical results are presented in 
section 5 and a brief summary is provided in a concluding section. 
 
2. Theory and Previous Literature 
 Numerous research studies investigate the determinants of teacher salaries.  Many of 
these focus specifically on how teacher unions affect teacher salaries.51  Theory suggests that the 
effect of unions on the level and structure of teacher salaries should be determined by union 
goals and bargaining power.  Union goals are most readily understood by reference to some form 
of a median voter model, discussed below.  Bargaining power derives from numerous factors, 
including state collective bargaining laws, the extent of organizing, political support, the 
structure of districts (which affects employer concentration), and financial ability to pay. 
Previous empirical studies typically regress the log of average salaries on union activity 
measures and other characteristics of the school district and local labor market.   Results vary 
considerably across studies in part due to the measures of teacher salaries and union activity that 
are used.  A few studies find little to no effect, but most recent studies find at least a modest 
positive effect.52  Hoxby’s (1996) finding of a roughly five percent effect of collective 
bargaining representation on average teacher salaries is fairly representative of most studies.  
                                                            
51 Early reviews of the literature are provided by Lipsky (1982), Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), and Freeman 
(1986). 
52 In a recent paper Lovenheim (2008) finds collective bargaining coverage to have virtually no effect on average 
teacher salaries in three Midwestern states.  His results, however, also suggest that collective bargaining is 
associated with increased enrollment and teacher employment in these states.  If the increased employment 
decreased the average level of experience and education in these districts, then the effect of unionization on average 
salaries may be downwardly biased. 
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Still, at least a few studies find union effects as large as 20 percent of wages (e.g., Baugh and 
Stone 1982; Zwerling and Thomason 1995).   
A few studies also recognize that teacher unions might differentially affect the salaries of 
teachers within a given district.  In other words, unions not only affect the average level of 
salaries but also the distribution of salaries within a district.  Holmes (1976) finds that unions 
increase both the return to experience and the return to education within a district.  Similarly, 
Delaney (1985) finds that collective bargaining increases the salary differential between 
experienced teachers and inexperienced teachers.  Zwerling and Thomason (1995) and Lentz 
(1998) also find that while unions have a positive and significant effect on the salaries of 
teachers earning the highest salary in a district, unions have a small (though still positive) and 
insignificant effect on the lowest salary in a district.  Babcock and Engberg (1999) and Ballou 
and Podgursky (2002) also suggest that the average levels of teaching experience and education 
in a district affect the returns to experience and education as well. 
The effect of teacher unions on intra-district salary differentials is often explained by 
appealing to the median voter model.  Virtually all public school districts, including those 
without collective bargaining, pay teachers according to a salary schedule that maps salary to 
teaching experience and education.  In the absence of union pressures, district administrators 
may dictate a salary schedule that is more appealing to marginal teachers than median teachers, 
with the marginal teachers being those at the tails of the distributions of experience and 
education.  However, the union’s preferred salary structure may be heavily influenced by the 
preferences and hence characteristics (i.e. experience and education) of the median teacher in the 
district.  According to data tabulated from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) 
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Teacher Survey, about half of public school teachers in the U.S. had advanced degrees and the 
average experience was about fifteen years.   
Because there are multiple dimensions to union contracts (returns to experience, returns 
to education, the level of fringe benefits, etc.), the median voter model may not adequately 
explain the salary determination process within districts.  Having multiple choice variables 
means that there is likely no single median voter whose preferences are decisive.   Instead, it may 
be useful to more generally view union preferences as resulting from a majority coalition of 
teachers.  Union cohesion may even require that there be a super-majority coalition.  Even with 
multiple choices to be made, though, it still seems likely that teachers with median levels of 
experience and education will be important members of the majority coalition and will push for a 
salary structure that benefits them.  Teachers with little or no experience may be the ones most 
likely to be left out of the majority coalition for several reasons.  First, inexperienced teachers 
may be less likely to be members of the union and less likely to be active in the union when they 
are members.  Additionally, union contracts are often negotiated months or even years in 
advance of the school year for which they apply.  As a result, the very newest teachers never had 
a vote on how the salary schedule would be structured.  School district administrators, however, 
are likely to be sensitive to market conditions for new school teachers since this is when teachers 
are most mobile.  Thus, we might expect unionized school districts with strong union bargaining 
power to respond to the preferences of experienced (median voter) teachers, whereas nonunion 
districts or union districts where bargaining power is weak may be more responsive to market 
conditions for new teachers. 
It is reasonable to expect that unions might increase the salary differential between 
beginning and experienced teachers even absent the median voter mechanism.  Entry-level 
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teachers searching for jobs are substantially more mobile than experienced teachers.  Hence, 
starting salaries among nearly all districts must be reasonably competitive in order to attract 
teachers of any given quality.  As teacher mobility decreases with experience and district-
specific tenure employer monopsony power may increase, leading to salaries below competitive 
levels for experienced (but not beginning) teachers in districts with low mobility.  Union 
bargaining power can offset this monopsony power, thus creating a union wage gap for 
experienced teachers (i.e., higher salaries for experienced teachers in union than in nonunion 
districts), while at the same time having little effect on starting salaries for union relative to 
nonunion teachers.   
Unions might also increase the salary differential between teachers with and without 
advanced degrees.  This shifting in the salary structure may even result in less experienced 
teachers having lower salaries than would be the case in the absence of union negotiations.  Such 
a “deferred payment” scheme should attract teachers willing to accept low initial salaries based 
on the expectation that they will receive subsequent rewards for tenure and an advanced degree.  
Chambers (1977), Delaney (1985) and Zwerling and Thomason (1995) suggest that union 
activity in a district produces positive wage spillovers in nearby districts.  In fact, all three 
studies suggest that the union spillover effect on wages is larger than the direct effect.  A few 
more recent studies suggest that teacher wage spillovers may be more direct.  Wagner and Porter 
(2000), Greenbaum (2002), Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum (2005), and Millimet and 
Rangaprasad (2007) find using spatial econometric methods that teacher salaries in a district are 
positively influenced by teacher salaries in nearby districts.53  In other words, teacher salaries 
                                                            
53 Ready and Sandver (1993) also find that salaries are correlated with salaries in nearby districts.  However, their 
analysis is based on OLS and does not account for the simultaneity of salaries for districts in close proximity.  As 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section, appropriate spatial methods account for the simultaneity in 
teacher salaries using instrumental variables. 
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appear to be spatially dependent, at least in the states considered in these studies.54  However, 
each of these studies examines a single state and with the exception of Babcock et al. (2005) do 
not generally focus on the effects of unions.  The current paper makes an important contribution 
to the literature by using a national level dataset to examine the effect of unions on teacher 
salaries in a spatial econometric framework. 
 
3. Empirical Model 
 Most previous studies of the determinants of teacher salaries do not account for spatial 
dependence.   The usual estimation equation in these studies is given by: 
 ܻ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ݑ,          (1) 
where ܻ is an ݊ ൈ 1 vector of teacher salaries (usually measured in logs), ܺ is an ݊ ൈ ݇ matrix of 
explanatory variables, ߚ is a ݇ ൈ 1 vector of parameters, and ݑ is a mean zero error term 
assumed to be i.i.d. across observations. 
In this paper we consider the possibility that teacher salaries are spatially correlated after 
controlling for other determinants of teacher salaries.  The primary concern is that teacher 
salaries in a district may be affected by teacher salaries in neighboring districts.  This type of 
spatial dependence is likely to occur for at least two reasons.  First, school districts likely 
compete with nearby districts for quality teachers.  If one district offers a salary substantially 
below that of nearby districts, they will have difficulty hiring and retaining quality teachers.  
Thus school district administrators have incentives to keep teacher salaries, especially starting 
salaries, competitive with salaries in nearby districts.  Similarly, comparisons of salaries in 
nearby districts are almost always used in contract negotiations between administrators and 
                                                            
54 Wagner and Porter (2000) examine school districts in Ohio; Greenbaum (2002) and Babcock et al. (2005) 
examine districts in Pennsylvania; and Millimet and Prangasad (2007) examine districts in Illinois. 
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teacher unions.  Thus spatial dependence in teacher salaries seems quite plausible.  If there is 
spatial dependence in the dependent variable then methods that do not account for this are likely 
to produce inconsistent coefficient estimates (Anselin, 1988).  A second concern is that there 
may be spatial correlation in the error term, say from spatially correlated measurement error in 
an explanatory variable (e.g., the county unemployment rate) for nearby districts (Kalenkoski 
and Lacombe 2008).  Failing to account for spatial correlation in the error term may result in 
standard errors that are inconsistently estimated.   
The spatial model can be represented by: 
 ܻ ൌ ߩܹܻ ൅ ܺߚ ൅ ݑ         (2) 
 ݑ ൌ ߣܹݑ ൅ ߝ, 
where ܹ is an ݊ ൈ ݊ weighting matrix that specifies the structure of the spatial correlation, ߩ and 
ߣ are spatial autocorrelation coefficients for the dependent variable and the error term, 
respectively, and ߝ is a mean zero error term that is i.i.d. across observations.  In the current 
paper, ܹ is specified based on the distance between school districts.  For row i of matrix ܹ, 
districts that are more than 50 miles away from i are given zero weight.  In other words districts 
are only considered neighbors if they are within 50 miles of each other.  Districts within 50 miles 
of i are weighted based on their inverse distance to i, so that nearer districts are given more 
weight than districts further away.55  The choice of this weighting matrix reflects the assumption 
that salaries in a district are most strongly affected by salaries in other districts that are closest to 
it and that the effect is attenuated with distance.  The matrix is also structured so that the 
elements in each row sum to unity and all diagonal elements are equal to zero.56   In other words, 
ܹܻ is a distance-weighted average of teacher salaries in nearby districts, and ܹݑ is a distance-
                                                            
55 Alternatively, we could equally weight all districts within 50 miles.  The results are not considerably affected by 
this modification to the weighting scheme. 
56 The zero diagonals reflect the assumption that a district cannot be its own neighbor. 
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weighted average of the error terms in nearby districts.  We can also estimate a spatial model that 
allows for a more robust specification of the spatial dependence in the errors.  Specifically, 
instead of assuming that ݑ ൌ ߣܹݑ ൅ ߝ as in equation (2), we can estimate an equation with a 
spatially lagged dependent variable while allowing for error correlation or clustering within 
groups.57  In the empirical analysis to follow we estimate both equations that model the spatial 
error correlation as in equation (2) and equations that include a spatially lagged dependent 
variable, then account for cross-sectional dependence in the error terms.58 
 It should be clear that teacher salaries in neighboring districts may be simultaneously 
determined.  Salaries in district j affect salaries in district i, but salaries in district i also affect 
salaries in district j.  Because of the simultaneity involved, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
to estimate the spatial model is inappropriate.  Instead, instrumental variable methods should be 
used.  More specifically, the present paper estimates the spatial models by the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) using the 
Spatial Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB developed by James LeSage and described in 
LeSage (1999).  The GMM estimator instruments for ܹܻ using ܹܺ and ܹଶܺ  as instruments.  
In other words, the estimator instruments for salaries in nearby districts using the distance-
weighted averages of the other explanatory variables in nearby districts along with the distance-
weighted averages of their neighbors’ neighbors’ characteristics.   
 Kelejian and Prucha (1998) outline the conditions under which the GMM estimator 
provides consistent estimates.  While the reader is referred to Kelejian and Prucha (1998) for a 
more formal discussion, a brief discussion of some of these assumptions is useful.  First, the 
                                                            
57 Some spatial econometric studies also estimate a model that assumes that there is spatial correlation in the errors 
but not in the dependent variable, i.e. ߩ ൌ 0.  Because we have reason to believe that teacher salaries are directly 
affected by teacher salaries in neighboring districts, the spatial error model that assumes no spatial correlation in the 
dependent variable seems inappropriate. 
58 Wooldridge (2003, 2006) provides a discussion of the use of cluster methods in applied econometrics. 
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diagonal elements of ܹ are zero.   Additionally, ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿ is nonsingular, where ܫ is an ݊ ൈ ݊ 
identity matrix, and the absolute values of ߩ and ߣ are each less than one.  The row and column 
sums of ܹ and ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ are bounded in absolute value, where  ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ is an ݊ ൈ ݊ 
inverse matrix.  Additionally, the matrix of exogenous regressors and the matrix of instruments 
have full column rank.  It must also be the case that at least one of the nonconstant exogenous 
regressors in the model has a nonzero effect on ܻ.  In other words, we need the instruments to 
predict ܹܻ in order for the model to be identified.  Again, for a more complete discussion and a 
proof of the consistency of the estimator, the reader is referred to Kelejian and Prucha (1998). 
 The marginal effects of the exogenous variables in equation (2) are not equal to the 
parameters in vector ߚ.  Rewriting equation (2) as: 
 ܻ ൌ ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵܺߚ ൅ ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵݑ,       (3) 
 is an  identity matrixit is easily seen that the partial derivative of ܻ with respect to a single 
exogenous variable ܺ௞ (݊ ൈ 1) is given by: 
  ߲ܻ/߲ܺ௞ᇱ ൌ ቈ
ങೊభ/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊభ/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊభ/ങ೉೙ೖ
ങೊమ/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊమ/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊమ/ങ೉೙ೖ
  ڭ                           ڭ               ڰ            ڭ       
ങೊ೙/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊ೙/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊ೙/ങ೉೙ೖ
቉ ൌ ߚ௞ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ.  (4) 
Therefore, the marginal effect on teacher salaries of an explanatory variable such as union 
activity is ߚ௞ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ.  If ܺ௞ is measured at the district level, then the average marginal effect 
of an increase in ܺ௞ in a district on teacher salaries in that district is equal to ߚ௞ times the 
average of the diagonal elements of the ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ matrix.  More formally, setting 
  ܣ ൌ ሾܫ െ ߩܹሿିଵ ൌ ቈ
ೌభభ    ೌభమ …  ೌభ೙
ೌమభ    ೌమమ …  ೌమ೙
  ڭ           ڭ     ڰ      ڭ 
ೌ೙భ    ೌ೙మ …  ೌ೙೙
቉,      (5) 
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the average marginal effect of an increase in ܺ௞ in a district on teacher salaries in that district is 
ߚ௞
ଵ
௡
∑ ௝ܽ௝
௡
௝ୀଵ .  If ܺ௞ is measured at a level of concentration larger than the district, such as the 
state, then the average marginal effect of an increase in ܺ௞ at the state level on teacher salaries in 
a district is equal to ߚ௞
ଵ
௡
∑ ∑ ݀௜௝ܽ௜௝
௡
௜ୀଵ
௡
௝ୀଵ , where ݀௜௝ is equal to one if i = j or if i and j are in the 
same state and are defined as neighbors according to the spatial weight matrix (i.e. within 50 
miles of each other in this paper).  Because ܺ௞ is measured at the state level, the marginal effect 
of ܺ௞ on ܻ for district i includes not only the direct effect of district i but also the indirect effects 
of “neighboring” districts in the same state.  Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) show that if ܺ௞ 
does not vary among neighboring districts (e.g., the variable is measured at the state level and all 
neighbors are in the same state), then the average marginal effect of a unit increase in ܺ௞ is equal 
to ߚ௞/ሺ1 െ ߩሻ.  We can think of 
ଵ
௡
∑ ∑ ݀௜௝ܽ௜௝
௡
௜ୀଵ
௡
௝ୀଵ  as a spatial multiplier with both 
ଵ
௡
∑ ௝ܽ௝
௡
௝ୀଵ  
and 1/ሺ1 െ ߩሻ as special cases.  In the results section, we report both the coefficient estimates 
and the average marginal effects for the exogenous variables in the spatial models. 
 
4. Data 
 The primary data used in this analysis come from the school district survey of the 1999-
2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) and completed by school district administrators.  We examine school districts 
in the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  Additional data are obtained from the NCES Common Core of 
Data (CCD), the NCES Comparable Wage Index (CWI) which measures the wages in the local 
labor market of occupations comparable to teaching, the NCES School District Demographics 
System (SDDS), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
61 
 
 
(LAUS).  Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the study and documents 
the source for each. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Salary BA0 25,901 3,802 16,350 43,085 SASS
Salary MA20 48,986 11,349 20,775 98,207 SASS
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) 0.896 0.113 0.703 1.244 CWI
Log (Salary BA0/CWI) 10.269 0.105 9.862 10.673 SASS & CWI
Log (Salary MA20/CWI) 10.779 0.155 10.205 11.365 SASS & CWI
Collective Bargaining 0.612 0.487 0 1 SASS
Meet and Confer 0.078 0.268 0 1 SASS
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.567 0.410 0 1 SASS
State Union Membership  0.765 0.185 0.312 0.992 SASS
Days of School 178.614 4.691 142 288 SASS
Student-Teacher Ratio 15.086 3.904 3.088 107.241 SASS
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.386 0.158 0 1 SASS
Share of White Teachers 0.900 0.188 0 1 SASS
Share of Teachers Dismissed 0.007 0.021 0 0.491 SASS
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/100) 0.039 0.174 -0.658 4.452 CCD
Log Enrollment 7.787 1.433 3.367 13.905 SASS
Share of White Students 0.763 0.272 0 1 SASS
Share of Low Income Students 0.397 0.250 0 1 SASS
Share HS Plus 0.796 0.099 0.201 1 SDDS
Share BA Plus 0.194 0.118 0.016 1 SDDS
Share w/ Children<18 0.319 0.054 0.123 1 SDDS
Share of Homeowners 0.734 0.115 0 0.970 SDDS
County Unemployment Rate 0.046 0.026 0.007 0.301 LAUS
Note: The dataset contains observations on 4237 school districts included in the 1999-2000 
SASS. 
 
 
 Teacher salaries are investigated for both beginning teachers and experienced teachers 
and come from the 1999-2000 SASS.  Beginning teacher salaries are measured by the base salary 
according to the district’s salary schedule for teachers with no teaching experience and only a 
bachelor’s degree (BA0).  Salaries for experienced teachers are measured by the base salary on 
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the district’s salary schedule for teachers with 20 years of teaching experience and a master’s 
degree related to the teaching field (MA20).59  Beginning teachers in the sample have a mean 
salary of $25,901 while the mean salary for experienced teachers is nearly twice that.  There is 
also considerably more variation in the salaries of experienced teachers.  The standard deviation 
in salaries for experienced teachers is nearly three times that of beginning teachers. 
For both beginning and experienced teachers, the dependent variable in the analysis 
below is measured as the log of the reported salary relative to the level of comparable wages of 
workers in the same labor market using the CWI (Taylor and Fowler 2006).  In other words, if 
௘ܹ௫௣ is the nominal salary for experienced teachers, ௕ܹ௘௚ is the nominal salary for beginning 
teachers, and ௖ܹ௢௠௣ is the value for the comparable wage index, then the dependent variable for 
experienced teachers is ln ሺ ௘ܹ௫௣/ ௖ܹ௢௠௣ሻ and the dependent variable for beginning teachers is 
ln ሺ ௕ܹ௘௚/ ௖ܹ௢௠௣ሻ.  Comparable wages provide a good measure of the relative cost of living in a 
particular labor market and also serve as a proxy for the opportunity cost of teaching in a given 
market (Stoddard 2005).  Without measuring teacher salaries relative to comparable wages, 
spatial autocorrelation could in part result from salaries being high for all districts in expensive 
labor markets and low for districts in inexpensive labor markets.  Measuring teacher salaries 
relative to comparable wages, any spatial autocorrelation that we find will be more than just the 
result of nearby districts responding similarly to similar living costs. 
 The regression analysis below includes a number of important explanatory variables.  
The effect of unions is given considerable emphasis in this paper and union activity is measured 
in three different ways.  We first measure union activity by two mutually exclusive indicator 
                                                            
59 Individual teachers are sometimes paid amounts above that required by the salary schedule for special credentials 
or extra duties such as coaching a sports team.  However, the salary measures in this paper are for the base salary in 
the district and do not include extra pay for special credentials or extra duties. 
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variables for collective bargaining and the presence of a meet and confer agreement in the 
district.  Meet and confer agreements are not binding on school districts and are considered to be 
a much weaker form of union activity than collective bargaining.  As seen in Table 1, more than 
61 percent of the districts engage in collective bargaining, and another eight percent have meet 
and confer agreements.  Thus roughly 31 percent of districts have neither.  Previous literature has 
suggested that union activity in neighboring districts has important spillover effects, and the next 
two measures of union activity incorporate union spillovers.  The second measure of union 
activity is the share of districts in a state with a collective bargaining agreement.60  If collective 
bargaining has important spillovers effects for teacher salaries in nearby districts, the effect for 
the state collective bargaining share should be greater than the effect for the collective bargaining 
indicator variable.  The third measure of union activity is the percentage of teachers in a state 
who are members of a teacher union, which also incorporates union spillovers.  Unfortunately, 
union membership at the district level is not available, so we cannot compare the effects of state 
membership density to that of district membership density.  Though the second and third 
measures of union activity both incorporate union spillovers, they are different measures and 
could produce somewhat different results.61   
 The analysis also includes a number of other important variables thought to affect teacher 
salaries.  Teachers are expected to require greater compensation for longer school years, so the 
number of days in the school year is expected to have a positive sign.  Teachers likely prefer 
                                                            
60 We also experimented with measuring union activity by the share of districts in a state with a meet and confer 
agreement and the share of districts in a state with any sort of agreement (e.g., collective bargaining or meet and 
confer).  The results for the share of districts with meet and confer was either negative or small and insignificant, 
consistent with later results suggesting that meet and confer agreements do not increase teacher salaries.  The results 
for the share with any agreement variable are qualitatively similar to the results for the share with collective 
bargaining.  These results are available from the author. 
61 One limitation to the current paper is that all of the union activity measures are treated as exogenous.  If union 
activity is in fact endogenous because of simultaneity, omitted variables, or measurement error, coefficient estimates 
could be biased and inconsistent. 
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smaller classes, so the student-teacher ratio is expected to have a positive coefficient.  Secondary 
teaching may be more difficult or require greater skills, so the share of secondary teachers is 
expected to have a positive coefficient.  The share of teachers who are white is included as a 
control, but the expected effect is somewhat unclear.  Districts that have dismissed relatively 
large numbers of teachers recently may have a low need for teachers and pay less competitive 
salaries.  Districts that have experienced increased enrollments over the previous five years are 
expected to have a high demand for teachers and be willing to pay higher relative salaries.  
Similarly, larger districts are expected to pay more competitive salaries, and the log of district 
enrollment is expected to have a positive coefficient.  Teachers may require compensating 
differentials to teach students from disadvantaged backgrounds, so the share of students who are 
white is expected to have a negative effect, while the share of students that are low income as 
measured by free or reduced lunch eligibility is expected to have a positive effect.  More 
educated residents are thought to have greater demand for education, so the share of adults (age 
25+) living in the district with at least a high school degree and the share of adults with at least a 
bachelor’s degree are both expected to have positive coefficients.  Residents with children are 
expected to demand greater spending on education, so the share of households with at least one 
child under age 18 is expected to have a positive effect.  Renters may be more likely than 
homeowners to support spending on education, so the share of households who are homeowners 
is expected to have a negative effect.  Finally, the unemployment rate in the county in which the 
district is located is included to capture local labor market conditions.  Higher unemployment is 
likely to make it more difficult to find a well-paying career outside of teaching and is expected to 
have a negative effect on teacher salaries. 
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5. Results 
 We begin by estimating equation (1) using OLS.  However, because social comparisons 
are likely to be important in the determination of teacher salaries and because previous research 
has found evidence of spatial dependence in teacher salaries, the preferred methods account for 
spatial correlation in the dependent variable.  We next estimate the spatial model of equation (2) 
using GMM, which also models spatial dependence in the error term.  We then estimate the 
equation that includes a spatially lagged dependent variable with standard errors clustered by 
state.  Results that measure union activity by collective bargaining and meet and confer indicator 
variables are discussed first and reported in Tables 2 and 3 for experienced and beginning 
teachers, respectively.  Tables 4 and 5 reestimate the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring 
union activity by the share of districts in the state with a collective bargaining agreement.  Tables 
6 and 7 reestimate the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring union activity by the share of 
teachers in the state who are members of a teacher union.  For exogenous variables in the spatial 
models, we report coefficient estimates, standard errors in parentheses, and average marginal 
effects in brackets computed as described above in Section 3.62  When discussing magnitudes for 
these variables, we will focus on the marginal effects.63 
Spatial Correlation Coefficients 
 The results confirm that salaries are spatially dependent for both experienced teachers 
and beginning teachers even after controlling for many other variables that explain teacher 
salaries.  The spatial models that also model the spatial error correlation in column 2 of Tables 2 
and 3 report statistically significant spatial lag coefficients (ߩ) of 0.68 and 0.92 for experienced 
and beginning teachers, respectively.  The larger coefficient for beginning teachers is likely due 
                                                            
62 For ease of discussion, we often refer to the average marginal effect simply as the marginal effect.   
63 Note that coefficient estimates in the OLS equations can be directly interpreted as marginal effects because of the 
linearity assumption. 
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to the greater mobility of new than experienced teachers.  District administrators may be 
especially concerned with keeping beginning salaries competitive in order to be able to hire and 
retain beginning teachers.  Because experienced teachers are usually less mobile, spatial 
dependence in salaries for experienced teachers may result more from union bargaining efforts to 
keep salaries comparable to those in nearby districts.  According to these estimates, a one percent 
increase in the distance-weighted average of experienced teacher salaries in nearby districts 
increases salaries for experienced teachers in a given district by 0.68 percent.  For beginning 
teachers, the effect of salaries in nearby districts is even stronger; a one percent increase in the 
distance-weighted average of salaries for beginning teachers in nearby districts increases salaries 
for beginning teachers by 0.92 percent.  For experienced teachers, the spatial error coefficient (ߣ) 
in the second column of Table 2 is small and not statistically different from zero.  For beginning 
teachers, however, the spatial error coefficient in column 2 of Table 3 is -0.29 and is statistically 
different from zero.  A negative coefficient for the spatial error term is counterintuitive but 
actually quite common when estimating a general spatial model.  For experienced teachers the 
spatial lag coefficient is virtually unchanged in column 3 of Table 2 when we do not specifically 
model the spatial error structure.  For beginning teachers, however, the spatial lag coefficient 
decreases slightly to 0.85, as seen in column 3 of Table 3, but the difference is not significant.  
More generally, marginal effects and statistical significance for most variables are virtually 
unchanged by moving from column 2 to column 3.   
 
Table 2: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with Union Indicator Variables 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.6811*** 0.6766*** 
(0.0294) (0.0791) 
Spatial Error (λ) -0.0275 
(0.0583) 
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Collective Bargaining 0.1095*** 0.0374*** 0.0378*** 
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0132) 
[0.0417] [0.0421] 
Meet and Confer 0.0110 0.0037 0.0044 
(0.0084) (0.0064) (0.0087) 
[0.0041] [0.0049] 
Days of School (/100) 0.3011*** 0.1273*** 0.1274** 
(0.0453) (0.0353) (0.0568) 
[0.1421] [0.1419] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.0006 0.0380 0.0418 
(0.0619) (0.0470) (0.0474) 
[0.0424] [0.0466] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0588*** 0.0579*** 0.0576** 
(0.0135) (0.0103) (0.0237) 
[0.0646] [0.0642] 
Share of White Teachers 0.0411*** 0.0210** 0.0212** 
(0.0134) (0.0103) (0.0088) 
[0.0234] [0.0236] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0794 -0.0609 -0.0577 
(0.0997) (0.0762) (0.0818) 
[-0.068] [-0.0643] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 2.2773* 0.5479 0.5467 
(1.2666) (0.9687) (0.9146) 
[0.6116] [0.6089] 
Log Enrollment 0.0168*** 0.0118*** 0.0121*** 
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0038) 
[0.0132] [0.0135] 
Share of White Students -0.0159 -0.0058 -0.0058 
(0.0119) (0.0090) (0.0147) 
[-0.0065] [-0.0065] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0568*** -0.0215** -0.0216** 
(0.0114) (0.0088) (0.0081) 
[-0.0240] [-0.0242] 
Share HS Plus 0.0112 0.0073 0.0078 
(0.0382) (0.0289) (0.0631) 
[0.0081] [0.0087] 
Share BA Plus 0.1704*** 0.1217*** 0.1230*** 
(0.0267) (0.0203) (0.0426) 
[0.1359] [0.1370] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.3345*** -0.2022*** -0.2017*** 
(0.0408) (0.0316) (0.0522) 
68 
 
 
[-0.2257] [-0.2247] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0142 -0.0172 -0.0177 
(0.0220) (0.0168) (0.0301) 
[-0.0192] [-0.0197] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.8452*** 0.5115*** 0.5148*** 
(0.0929) (0.0714) (0.1076) 
[0.7539] [0.7545] 
R2 0.2548 0.5636 0.5649 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of experience and a master’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with Union Indicator Variables 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.9155*** 0.8477*** 
(0.0405) (0.0654) 
Spatial Error (λ) -0.2910*** 
(0.0128) 
Collective Bargaining 0.0071* 0.0023 0.0023 
(0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0048) 
[0.0034] [0.0030] 
Meet and Confer -0.0110* 0.0001 0.0007 
(0.0064) (0.0044) (0.0051) 
[0.0001] [0.0009] 
Days of School (/100) 0.0887*** 0.0369 0.0540* 
(0.0344) (0.0233) (0.0305) 
[0.0548] [0.0695] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.0934** -0.0084 -0.0018 
(0.0470) (0.0322) (0.0341) 
[-0.0125] [-0.0023] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0456*** 0.0363*** 0.0363** 
(0.0103) (0.0071) (0.0164) 
[0.0540] [0.0467] 
Share of White Teachers -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0000 
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(0.0102) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
[-0.0016] [0.0000] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0094 -0.0563 -0.0587 
(0.0756) (0.0544) (0.0413) 
[-0.0837] [-0.0755] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 0.8973 -0.0599 0.1801 
(0.9610) (0.6715) (0.8163) 
[-0.0890] [0.2317] 
Log Enrollment 0.0080*** 0.0022** 0.0034* 
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
[0.0033] [0.0044] 
Share of White Students -0.0064 -0.0008 -0.0028 
(0.0090) (0.0060) (0.0073) 
[-0.0012] [-0.0036] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0107 -0.0029 -0.0058 
(0.0086) (0.0060) (0.0085) 
[-0.0043] [-0.0075] 
Share HS Plus -0.1466*** -0.0326 -0.0388 
(0.0290) (0.0200) (0.0279) 
[-0.0485] [-0.0499] 
Share BA Plus 0.0597*** 0.0418*** 0.0536** 
(0.0202) (0.0135) (0.0220) 
[0.0621] [0.0690] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.2495*** -0.0964*** -0.1033** 
(0.0310) (0.0229) (0.0403) 
[-0.1433] [-0.1329] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0325* -0.0230* -0.0261 
(0.0167) (0.0120) (0.0187) 
[-0.0342] [-0.0336] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.5251*** 0.1871*** 0.2527*** 
(0.0705) (0.0458) (0.0830) 
[0.5029] [0.5114] 
R2 0.0598 0.4774 0.5065 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no experience and a bachelor’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Collective Bargaining and Meet and Confer Indicators 
 Estimating the effect of teacher unions on teacher salaries is a primary concern of this 
paper.  Previous studies have usually found that unions increase teacher salaries, at least for 
experienced teachers, but these studies do not generally account for spatial dependence in teacher 
salaries.  For experienced teachers, OLS suggests that the presence of collective bargaining 
increases teacher salaries by roughly 12 percent.  Accounting for a spatially lagged dependent 
variable, however, the average marginal effect of collective bargaining for experienced teachers 
is only 0.042, suggesting that collective bargaining increases salaries for experienced teachers by 
a little over four percent.64  Thus, it appears that failing to account for spatial dependence causes 
one to overstate the effects of collective bargaining in a district on the salaries of experienced 
teachers.  However, because collective bargaining is measured at the district level but may have 
spillover effects across districts, some of the observed wage spillover in Table 2 may be a union 
spillover.  Later on, we will measure union activity by two measures that incorporate union 
spillover effects, the share of districts in a state with collective bargaining and the share of 
workers in a state who are members of a teacher union. 
 For beginning teachers accounting for spatial dependence has a similar effect on 
coefficient estimates for collective bargaining but on a much smaller scale.  OLS suggests a 
small but statistically significant effect of collective bargaining, just less than one percent.  The 
spatial models, however, suggest an even smaller effect that is not statistically different from 
zero.  Thus, consistent with previous literature, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
collective bargaining increases teacher salaries for experienced teachers but not for beginning 
teachers. 
                                                            
64 Recall that the average marginal effect is the arithmetic mean of the marginal effects for individual districts.  
Differences in the estimated marginal effects across districts are generally quite small and result from the structure 
of the weighting matrix. 
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 Tables 2 and 3 also include an indicator variable for the presence of a meet and confer 
agreement in the district.  A meet and confer agreement is a much weaker form of union activity 
than collective bargaining, so we expect the effect of a meet and confer agreement on teacher 
salaries to be smaller than the effect of collective bargaining.  For experienced teachers the meet 
and confer effect is small, positive, and statistically insignificant in all three specifications in 
Table 2.  For beginning teachers the meet and confer effect in the OLS specification is negative 
and statistically significant though small.  Accounting for spatial dependence, though, the meet 
and confer effect for beginning teachers is very small, positive, and highly insignificant.  The 
results, therefore, suggest that while collective bargaining increases the salaries of experienced 
teachers, the presence of a meet and confer agreement has virtually no effect on the salaries of 
experienced or beginning teachers.  Although we cannot test it, meet and confer agreements may 
provide other benefits to workers as compared to nonunion districts such as providing a modest 
level of collective voice.   
Additional Explanatory Variables 
 The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that additional variables affect teacher salaries as 
well.  These include characteristics of the teachers, the school district, the students, the local 
residents, and the local labor market.  Importantly, the results for the spatial models are often 
quite different from the OLS results for equation (1) in the first column of the tables.  Here we 
discuss the results in the third columns of Table 2 and 3 for the spatial model that clusters 
standard errors by state instead of modeling the spatial error correlation.  Because the dependent 
variables are measured in logs, the marginal effects can be loosely interpreted as percentage 
changes.  The length of the school year has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
salaries of experienced teachers with a marginal effect of 0.142.  For beginning teachers the 
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effect is smaller, though still statistically significant at the 10 percent level, with a marginal 
effect of 0.070.65  The student-teacher ratio has a positive but insignificant effect for salaries of 
experienced teachers, and a small negative and highly insignificant effect for beginning teachers.  
For both experienced and beginning teachers, salaries increase with the percentage of teachers 
who teach secondary grades, with significant marginal effects of 0.064 and 0.047, respectively.  
This suggests that secondary teaching is either less pleasant or requires greater skills or greater 
effort than teaching primary grades (Walden and Sogutlu 2001).  The results also suggest that the 
percentage of teachers who are white has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
salaries of experienced teachers, with a marginal effect of 0.024 but a small, negative, and highly 
insignificant effect on the salaries of beginning teachers.  For experienced teachers, this may 
result from white teachers having better outside labor market options than non-white teachers, 
perhaps in part due to discrimination, though the effect is not especially large.  The percentage of 
teachers dismissed in the previous year and the growth in enrollment over the last five years both 
have a statistically insignificant effect on the salaries of both beginning and experienced 
teachers.  Larger school districts pay higher salaries to both experienced and beginning teachers, 
with enrollment elasticities of 0.014 and 0.004, respectively.  This may suggest that larger school 
districts are worse places to work and require compensating differentials (Walden and Newmark 
1995).  The share of students who are white has a small and highly insignificant effect for both 
experienced and beginning teachers.  This is in contrast to Martin (forthcoming) who finds that 
teachers require positive compensating wage differentials to work in districts with a higher 
percentage of minority students.  The share of low-income students has a significant coefficient 
for experienced teachers, with a marginal effect of -0.024, but a small and insignificant effect for 
beginning teachers. 
                                                            
65 The effect for beginning teachers, however, is marginally insignificant in column 2. 
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 The results also suggest that teacher salaries are affected by the local demand for 
education.  Increases in the share of the adult population with a college degree increases salaries 
for both experienced and beginning teachers, with marginal effects of 0.137 and 0.069.  The 
share of the population with a high school degree or higher, however, has a positive and 
insignificant effect on the salaries of experienced teachers and a negative and insignificant effect 
on the salaries of beginning teachers.  The share of households in a district with children under 
age 18 results in significantly lower salaries for both experienced and beginning teachers, with 
marginal effects of -0.225 and -0.133.  This is in contrast to expectations that households with 
children would demand greater education services and be willing to support higher teacher 
salaries.  The share of households in a district who are homeowners has a negative but 
insignificant effect on the salaries of both experienced and beginning teachers.66    The results 
also suggest that local labor market conditions measured by the county unemployment rate have 
a statistically significant effect on the salaries of experienced and beginning teachers, with 
marginal effects of 0.755 and 0.511, respectively.  However, the positive effect of unemployment 
on teacher salaries is somewhat unexpected. 
Measuring Union Activity by the State Share of Districts with Collective Bargaining 
 Tables 4 and 5 present the results of re-estimating the equations in Tables 2 and 3 
measuring union activity by the share of districts in a state with a collective bargaining 
agreement.  The first thing to note is that the spatial lag coefficient decreases to 0.51 and 0.56 for 
experienced teachers in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4. This seems to confirm our earlier hypothesis 
that the spatial lag coefficients in Table 2 were partially capturing union spillovers.  Also unlike 
                                                            
66 In column 2 of Table 3, however, the share of homeowners has a marginal effect of -0.034 that is significant at the 
10 percent level.  This result may weakly suggest that renters are more supportive of spending on education than are 
homeowners, perhaps in part because renters do not believe that they bear the burden of local property taxes to 
finance education (Martinez-Vasquez and Sjoquist, 1988). 
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the results in Table 2, the spatial error coefficient for experienced teachers in Table 4 is positive 
and statistically significant.  For beginning teachers coefficients for the spatial lag and the spatial 
error in Table 5 are nearly identical to the estimates reported in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 4: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with State Collective Bargaining Share 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.5120*** 0.5639*** 
(0.0430) (0.1021) 
Spatial Error (λ) 0.1455** 
(0.0649) 
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.1736*** 0.0800*** 0.0719*** 
(0.0057) (0.0092) (0.0218) 
[0.1505] [0.1495] 
Days of School (/100) 0.1955*** 0.1175*** 0.1184* 
(0.0436) (0.0368) (0.0641) 
[0.1235] [0.1262] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.0999* 0.0270 0.0027 
(0.0594) (0.0504) (0.0636) 
[0.0284] [0.0029] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0857*** 0.0657*** 0.0681*** 
(0.0130) (0.0109) (0.0241) 
[0.0690] [0.0726] 
Share of White Teachers 0.0374*** 0.0238** 0.0233** 
(0.0128) (0.0106) (0.0094) 
[0.0250] [0.0248] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0892 -0.0487 -0.0648 
(0.0955) (0.0778) (0.0804) 
[-0.0512] [-0.0691] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 2.8204** 0.9897 1.0232 
(1.2134) (1.0026) (0.9781) 
[1.0401] [1.0908] 
Log Enrollment 0.0220*** 0.0162*** 0.0149*** 
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0047) 
[0.0170] [0.0159] 
Share of White Students -0.0256* -0.0112 -0.0110 
(0.0114) (0.0097) (0.0165) 
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[-0.0118] [-0.0117] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0373*** -0.0212** -0.0204** 
(0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0090) 
[-0.0223] [-0.0217] 
Share HS Plus -0.0653* -0.0137 -0.0149 
(0.0364) (0.0313) (0.0699) 
[-0.0144] [-0.0159] 
Share BA Plus 0.1676*** 0.1372*** 0.1281*** 
(0.0255) (0.0217) (0.0457) 
[0.1442] [0.1366] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.2981*** -0.2057*** -0.2098*** 
(0.0391) (0.0333) (0.0537) 
[-0.2162] [-0.2236] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0430** -0.0056 -0.0037 
(0.0211) (0.0179) (0.0308) 
[-0.0059] [-0.0039] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.7432*** 0.5516*** 0.5306*** 
(0.0891) (0.0803) (0.1097) 
[0.6918] [0.6933] 
R2 .3162 .5487 .5458 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of experience and a master’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with State Collective Bargaining Share 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.9168*** 0.8552*** 
(0.0364) (0.0553) 
Spatial Error (λ) -0.3117*** 
(0.0166) 
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.0281*** 0.0051* 0.0059 
(0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0052) 
[0.0457] [0.0326] 
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Days of School (/100) 0.0643* 0.0303 0.0476 
(0.0344) (0.0232) (0.0307) 
[0.0452] [0.0619] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.1303*** -0.0155 -0.0075 
(0.0469) (0.0323) (0.0317) 
[-0.0231] [-0.0098] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0511*** 0.0375*** 0.0376** 
(0.0103) (0.0071) (0.0164) 
[0.0560] [0.0489] 
Share of White Teachers -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0003 
(0.0101) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
[-0.0021] [-0.0004] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0129 -0.0562 -0.0596 
(0.0754) (0.0542) (0.0410) 
[-0.0839] [-0.0775] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 1.0546 -0.0315 0.2061 
(0.9580) (0.6682) (0.8212) 
[-0.0470] [0.2682] 
Log Enrollment 0.0092*** 0.0024** 0.0036* 
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
[0.0036] [0.0047] 
Share of White Students -0.0089 -0.0013 -0.0034 
(0.0090) (0.0060) (0.0074) 
[-0.0019] [-0.0044] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0056 -0.0017 -0.0047 
(0.0086) (0.0060) (0.0084) 
[-0.0025] [-0.0061] 
Share HS Plus -0.1814*** -0.0370* -0.0431 
(0.0287) (0.0200) (0.0265) 
[-0.0552] [-0.0561] 
Share BA Plus 0.0641*** 0.0410*** 0.0540** 
(0.0201) (0.0134) (0.0223) 
[0.0612] [0.0703] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.2418*** -0.0944*** -0.1004** 
(0.0309) (0.0223) (0.0398) 
[-0.1409] [-0.1306] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0453*** -0.0209* -0.0246 
(0.0166) (0.0119) (0.0186) 
[-0.0312] [-0.0320] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.4997*** 0.1785*** 0.2459*** 
(0.0703) (0.0445) (0.0799) 
77 
 
 
[0.4836] [0.5093] 
R2 .0661 .4783 .5084 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no experience and a bachelor’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 The results in Table 4 also suggest that the share of districts with collective bargaining 
has a statistically significant effect on salaries of experienced teachers, with a marginal effect of 
0.150 in column 3.  This is more than three times the effect of collective bargaining in the third 
column of Table 2 suggesting that the spillover effects from collective bargaining are 
considerably larger than the direct effects.  In results not shown, we also estimated regressions that 
simultaneously included both an indicator variable for collective bargaining in a district and the state 
share of districts with collective bargaining.  In these regressions the effects on the indicator variable were 
virtually zero and not statistically significant, while the effects for the state collective bargaining share 
were virtually identical to the results in Tables 4 and 5.  This suggests that being in a heavily unionized 
state has a much more important effect on teacher salaries than being in a district with collective 
bargaining. 
 For beginning teachers, the share of districts with collective bargaining is significant at 
the 10 percent level in column 2 of Table 5, with a marginal effect of 0.046.  Clustering standard 
errors by state, however, the effect is no longer statistically significant.  This suggests that the 
state collective bargaining share likely has at most a weak effect on the salaries of beginning 
teachers.  The results for the additional explanatory variables in column 3 of Tables 4 and 5 are 
qualitatively similar to the corresponding results in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
78 
 
 
Measuring Union Activity by State Union Membership 
 Following Zwerling and Thomason (1995) we also explore measuring union activity by 
the percentage of teachers in a state who are members of a teacher union.  Tables 6 and 7 present 
the results of re-estimating the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring union activity by state 
union membership.  Like the share of districts in a state with collective bargaining, state union 
membership density incorporates union spillovers.  These two measures, however, could produce 
different results.  For example, the state membership density could have a stronger effect if it is a 
better measure of union strength.  A union bargaining in a district in which a large percentage of 
the teachers are union members is likely to have more power in contract negotiations.  
Furthermore, union members may be more active politically, even in districts without a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The votes of teachers can be quite important in state and local 
elections, especially in school board elections, where a relatively low percentage of the general 
population turns out to vote, but a larger percentage of teachers do (Moe 2006).  When teachers 
are highly organized, school boards may feel significant pressure to concede higher salaries and 
other union demands. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with State Union Membership Density 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.5375*** 0.5807*** 
(0.0469) (0.1020) 
Spatial Error (λ) 0.1356** 
(0.0646) 
State Union Membership 0.3421*** 0.1378*** 0.1246*** 
(0.0123) (0.0207) (0.0428) 
[0.2719] [0.2682] 
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Days of School (/100) 0.3078*** 0.1620*** 0.1655** 
(0.0437) (0.0374) (0.0653) 
[0.1714] [0.1773] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.0128 0.0656 0.0482 
(0.0599) (0.0500) (0.0718) 
[0.0694] [0.0517] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0647*** 0.0570*** 0.0583** 
(0.0132) (0.0108) (0.0249) 
[0.0603] [0.0625] 
Share of White Teachers 0.0323** 0.0226** 0.0215** 
(0.0130) (0.0106) (0.0091) 
[0.0239] [0.0230] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.1216 -0.0581 -0.0751 
(0.0969) (0.0782) (0.0857) 
[-0.0615] [-0.0805] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 1.4630 0.4501 0.4269 
(1.2298) (1.0014) (0.9918) 
[0.4762] [0.4576] 
Log Enrollment 0.0174*** 0.0141*** 0.0127*** 
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0041) 
[0.0149] [0.0136] 
Share of White Students -0.0315*** -0.0121 -0.0119 
(0.0116) (0.0098) (0.0170) 
[-0.0128] [-0.0128] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0337*** -0.0207** -0.0201** 
(0.0111) (0.0091) (0.0095) 
[-0.0219] [-0.0215] 
Share HS Plus 0.0517 0.0375 0.0385 
(0.0361) (0.0306) (0.0652) 
[0.0397] [0.0413] 
Share BA Plus 0.1259*** 0.1184*** 0.1105** 
(0.0258) (0.0216) (0.0442) 
[0.1253] [0.1184] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.3114*** -0.2087*** -0.2141*** 
(0.0397) (0.0334) (0.0546) 
[-0.2208] [-0.2294] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0313 -0.0152 -0.0129 
(0.0214) (0.0178) (0.0319) 
[-0.0161] [-0.0138] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.5914*** 0.4903*** 0.4747*** 
(0.0909) (0.0796) (0.1207) 
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[0.6270] [0.6294] 
R2 0.2965 0.5428 0.5456 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of experience and a master’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 7: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with State Union Membership Density 
  1  2  3  
Spatial Lag (ρ) 0.9070*** 0.8508*** 
(0.0380) (0.0562) 
Spatial Error (λ) -0.2996*** 
(0.0144) 
State Union Membership 0.0654*** 0.0062 0.0070 
(0.0096) (0.0065) (0.0129) 
[0.0505] [0.0377] 
Days of School (/100) 0.0781** 0.0380* 0.0537 
(0.0340) (0.0230) (0.0342) 
[0.0551] [0.0694] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.1233*** -0.0091 -0.0016 
(0.0466) (0.0321) (0.0328) 
[-0.0132] [-0.0021] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0486*** 0.0363*** 0.0365** 
(0.0102) (0.0071) (0.0164) 
[0.0526] [0.0472] 
Share of White Teachers -0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0002 
(0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
[-0.0020] [-0.0003] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0198 -0.0562 -0.0597 
(0.0753) (0.0544) (0.0409) 
[-0.0814] [-0.0772] 
% Δ Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/10,000) 0.8386 -0.0720 0.1613 
(0.9563) (0.6696) (0.8241) 
[-0.1043] [0.2085] 
Log Enrollment 0.0085*** 0.0022** 0.0034* 
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
[0.0032] [0.0044] 
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Share of White Students -0.0108 -0.0012 -0.0032 
(0.0090) (0.0061) (0.0075) 
[-0.0017] [-0.0041] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0036 -0.0025 -0.0053 
(0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0081) 
[-0.0036] [-0.0068] 
Share HS Plus -0.1673*** -0.0320 -0.0374 
(0.0281) (0.0195) (0.0278) 
[-0.0464] [-0.0483] 
Share BA Plus 0.0573*** 0.0403*** 0.0526** 
(0.0201) (0.0135) (0.0228) 
[0.0584] [0.0680] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.2424*** -0.0981*** -0.1023** 
(0.0308) (0.0225) (0.0397) 
[-0.1422] [-0.1322] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0462*** -0.0220* -0.0260 
(0.0166) (0.0121) (0.0193) 
[-0.0319] [-0.0336] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.4655*** 0.1837*** 0.2466*** 
(0.0707) (0.0449) (0.0813) 
[0.4706] [0.5038] 
R2 0.0679 0.4777 0.5060 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and columns 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no experience and a bachelor’s 
degree relative to the Comparable Wages Index.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial models.  Standard errors in column 3 are clustered 
by state. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 The spatial lag and spatial error results in Tables 6 and 7 measuring union activity by the 
state membership share are very similar to the corresponding estimates in Tables 4 and 5.  The 
results for the non-union variables in column 3 are quite similar to the corresponding estimates in 
Tables 4 and 5 as well.  For experienced teachers the state membership density has a significant 
marginal effect of 0.268 in column 3 of Table 6, but the effect for beginning teachers is 
insignificant.  While the marginal effect for experienced teachers is larger than that in Table 4, 
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we must also account for the fact that the state membership density is less dispersed than the 
state collective bargaining share to assess their relative impacts.  The state collective bargaining 
share has a minimum value of zero, a maximum value of one, and a standard deviation of 0.410, 
while the state membership density ranges between 0.312 and 0.992 and has a standard deviation 
of 0.185.  Therefore, according to the column 3 estimates in Tables 4 and 6 moving from a state 
with no collective bargaining to a state with complete collective bargaining coverage would 
increase salaries for experienced teachers by 16.1 percent, while moving from the state with the 
lowest membership density to the state with the greatest membership density would increase 
salaries for experienced teachers by 20.9 percent.  Alternatively, moving from one standard deviation 
below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of union activity increases salaries for 
experienced teachers by 13.2 percent for the collective bargaining share but only by 11.4 percent for the 
state membership density.  Moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of union activity 
increases salaries for experienced teachers by 14.1 percent for the collective bargaining share and by 9.3 
percent for the state membership density.  Thus, although the two measures differ, their estimated 
impacts on the salaries of experienced teachers are both fairly large. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Using a national level dataset this paper has shown that salaries for both experienced and 
beginning teachers are considerably affected by teacher salaries in nearby districts, though the 
effect is larger for beginning teachers.  Investigations of the determinants of teacher salaries that 
ignore spatial dependence are likely to be misspecified.   The results of the spatial regressions 
suggest that a number of other important factors affect teacher salaries.  The effect of unions on 
teacher salaries is given considerable attention in this paper.  Accounting for union spillovers, we 
find that collective bargaining and union membership density in a state increase salaries for 
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experienced teachers by as much as 16 and 21 percent, respectively, but the estimated effects on 
the salaries of beginning teachers are much smaller.  Given the relatively weak bargaining 
position of beginning relative to experienced teachers within unions (i.e. potential members 
versus voting members), this result is not surprising.  Although the median voter model 
explanation for this pattern of union wage effects appears most persuasive, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that wage-depressing monopsony effects among experienced teachers are being 
offset in union but not nonunion districts. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix Table A: Housing Characteristic Results for Log Rent Equation, 2006 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Two Rooms 0.030* 0.016 
Three Rooms 0.032* 0.017 
Four Rooms 0.073*** 0.017 
Five Rooms 0.138*** 0.017 
Six Rooms 0.226*** 0.018 
Seven Rooms 0.309*** 0.018 
Eight Rooms 0.383*** 0.019 
Nine Rooms or More 0.348*** 0.021 
One Bedroom 0.103*** 0.014 
Two Bedrooms 0.308*** 0.014 
Three Bedrooms 0.358*** 0.015 
Four Bedrooms 0.380*** 0.016 
Five Bedrooms or More 0.284*** 0.021 
Built 1990-1999 -0.073*** 0.005 
Built 1980-1989 -0.160*** 0.004 
Built 1970-1979 -0.220*** 0.004 
Built 1960-1969 -0.252*** 0.005 
Built 1950-1959 -0.274*** 0.005 
Built 1940-1949 -0.288*** 0.006 
Built before 1940 -0.251*** 0.005 
Lives in Mobile Home or Trailer -0.227*** 0.016 
Single-Family Home Detached 0.079*** 0.015 
Single-Family Home Attached -0.007 0.016 
Two-Unit Building 0.370*** 0.047 
3-4 Unit Building 0.333*** 0.047 
5-9 Unit Building 0.326*** 0.047 
10-19 Unit Building 0.363*** 0.047 
20-49 Unit Building 0.326*** 0.047 
50 Plus Unit Building 0.298*** 0.047 
House on Less than 10 Acres 0.409*** 0.05 
House on 10 Acres or More 0.254*** 0.051 
Kitchen Facilities -0.115*** 0.02 
Plumbing Facilities 0.248*** 0.022 
Note: Standard errors are robust. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table B: Price Indices by City, 2006 
  
Baseline 
Price 
Index
Rent-
based 
Index 
Value-
based 
Index 
Albany-Schenectady-Amsterdam, NY CSA 109.5 108.3 105.4
Albuquerque, NM CBSA 102.8 101.1 101.0
Amarillo, TX CBSA 88.7 91.9 85.9
Anniston-Oxford, AL CBSA 92.8 92.7 89.7
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI CSA 97.2 99.6 97.9
Asheville-Brevard, NC CSA 101.1 97.1 100.7
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville, GA-AL CSA 98.3 105.8 99.7
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC CBSA 93.7 94.5 91.3
Austin-Round Rock, TX CBSA 96.0 107.0 98.4
Bakersfield, CA CBSA 111.4 105.2 119.6
Bangor, ME CBSA* 104.4 100.0 98.9
Baton Rouge-Pierre Part, LA CSA 96.7 96.8 93.2
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX CBSA 93.1 94.2 86.3
Bellingham, WA CBSA 108.4 104.7 118.6
Bend-Prineville, OR CSA* 111.4 110.2 130.2
Birmingham-Hoover-Cullman, AL CSA 96.8 98.7 95.8
Bloomington, IN CBSA 97.6 98.9 92.8
Bloomington-Normal, IL CBSA 99.7 99.1 93.7
Boise City-Nampa, ID CBSA 98.1 100.6 102.4
Boston-Worcester-Manchester, MA-RI-NH CSA 131.1 123.2 139.3
Bowling Green, KY CBSA 93.7 92.2 88.8
Brownsville-Harlingen-Raymondville, TX CSA 88.0 87.8 83.3
Buffalo-Niagara-Cattaraugus, NY CSA 105.0 100.3 96.3
Burlington-South Burlington, VT CBSA 119.8 115.9 114.8
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL CBSA 108.9 112.7 121.2
Cedar Rapids, IA CBSA 93.5 94.4 92.4
Champaign-Urbana, IL CBSA 96.5 99.4 93.6
Charleston, WV CBSA 93.5 88.5 87.9
Charleston-North Charleston, SC CBSA 99.6 103.4 102.4
Charlotte-Gastonia-Salisbury, NC-SC CSA 92.0 98.2 95.5
Chattanooga-Cleveland-Athens, TN-GA CSA 93.9 90.6 91.4
Chicago-Naperville-Michigan City, IL-IN-WI CSA 113.1 112.5 115.5
Cincinnati-Middletown-Wilmington, OH-KY-IN CSA 94.2 95.6 93.9
Cleveland-Akron-Elyria, OH CSA 99.4 98.9 97.7
Colorado Springs, CO CBSA 95.3 102.7 100.1
Columbia, MO CBSA 92.2 95.4 91.3
Columbia-Newberry, SC CSA 94.3 97.4 92.9
Columbus-Auburn-Opelika, GA-AL CSA 95.7 98.1 94.3
Columbus-Marion-Chillicothe, OH CSA 103.3 101.1 98.5
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Corpus Christi-Kingsville, TX CSA 88.8 97.2 85.9
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CSA 94.0 104.4 94.1
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL CBSA 96.6 94.7 92.0
Dayton-Springfield-Greenville, OH CSA 94.5 96.2 93.4
Decatur, IL CBSA 90.8 90.8 85.5
Denver-Aurora-Boulder, CO1 CSA 102.1 105.4 107.6
Des Moines-Newton-Pella, IA CSA 93.3 95.0 89.7
Detroit-Warren-Flint, MI CSA 105.1 101.6 100.1
Dover, DE CBSA 100.3 103.7 100.9
Eau Claire-Menomonie, WI CSA 94.6 92.7 92.3
El Paso, TX CBSA 92.5 91.9 88.5
Erie, PA CBSA 97.8 95.4 91.9
Eugene-Springfield, OR CBSA 110.0 105.2 112.9
Evansville, IN-KY CBSA* 96.3 92.0 91.0
Fargo-Wahpeton, ND-MN CSA 95.3 91.8 89.4
Farmington, NM CBSA 97.6 94.0 100.7
Fayetteville, NC CBSA 99.8 100.8 95.5
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO CBSA 91.6 93.0 92.7
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL CBSA 88.2 87.3 86.2
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO CBSA 103.5 105.6 110.0
Fort Smith, AR-OK CBSA 87.9 87.9 84.2
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL CBSA 98.1 104.6 106.7
Fort Wayne-Huntington-Auburn, IN CSA 92.0 93.3 86.7
Fresno-Madera, CA CSA 122.0 107.9 124.4
Gainesville, FL CBSA 96.0 101.4 102.7
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI CSA 103.0 99.1 98.4
Green Bay, WI CBSA 95.3 97.4 95.9
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC CSA 92.4 94.5 93.0
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC CSA 92.7 92.8 92.1
Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS CSA 95.9 99.1 94.3
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV CBSA* 94.8 94.0 97.7
Harrisburg-Carlisle-Lebanon, PA CSA 103.3 100.7 98.6
Harrisonburg, VA CBSA 106.6 97.6 104.6
Hartford-West Hartford-Willimantic, CT CSA 118.3 112.8 120.0
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC CBSA 97.8 92.8 93.6
Houston-Baytown-Huntsville, TX CSA 90.1 102.0 91.3
Huntsville-Decatur, AL CSA 91.6 94.2 91.1
Indianapolis-Anderson-Columbus, IN CSA 97.0 97.9 92.2
Jacksonville, FL CBSA 97.1 92.9 87.1
Jacksonville, NC CBSA* 95.7 103.2 103.2
Jackson-Yazoo City, MS CSA 91.6 96.4 93.4
Janesville, WI CBSA 98.2 97.4 96.0
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol (Tri-Cities), TN-VA 89.6 86.0 87.4
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CSA 
Johnstown, PA CBSA* 93.2 88.6 85.3
Joplin, MO CBSA 84.2 84.1 80.3
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI CBSA 98.6 95.8 93.8
Kansas City-Overland Park-Kansas City, MO-KS CSA 95.5 99.3 94.4
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX CBSA 91.1 95.8 88.4
Knoxville-Sevierville-La Follette, TN CSA 88.9 88.7 88.7
Lafayette-Acadiana, LA CSA 97.5 93.2 91.0
Lake Charles-Jennings, LA CSA 95.5 92.2 88.8
Lancaster, PA CBSA 109.4 105.8 103.9
Laredo, TX CBSA 84.0 86.4 80.4
Las Cruces, NM CBSA 100.2 94.6 97.3
Las Vegas-Paradise-Pahrump, NV CSA 110.1 109.2 115.3
Lawrence, KS CBSA 94.9 98.4 94.6
Lawton, OK CBSA* 90.0 88.8 84.6
Lexington-Fayette--Frankfort--Richmond, KY CSA 96.6 92.7 92.2
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Pine Bluff, AR CSA 91.7 93.0 89.1
Longview-Marshall, TX CSA 88.6 91.1 85.4
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Riverside, CA CSA 148.3 128.4 158.5
Louisville-Jefferson--Elizabethtown--Scottsburg, KY-
IN CSA 97.6 97.5 97.5
Lubbock-Levelland, TX CSA 86.7 95.1 85.0
Macon-Warner Robins-Fort Valley, GA CSA 94.9 94.3 91.4
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX CBSA 85.5 87.1 82.1
Memphis, TN-MS-AR CBSA 94.1 98.7 91.6
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL CBSA 117.2 118.1 125.0
Midland-Odessa, TX CSA 88.7 94.1 84.0
Milwaukee-Racine-Waukesha, WI CSA 101.2 102.7 104.6
Minneapolis-St. Paul-St. Cloud, MN-WI CSA 101.9 107.4 108.7
Mobile-Daphne-Fairhope, AL CSA 92.1 95.4 92.6
Montgomery-Alexander City, AL CSA 96.8 94.7 89.4
Myrtle Beach-Conway-Georgetown, SC CSA 94.8 97.2 99.9
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Columbia, TN 
CSA 94.8 98.9 97.0
New Orleans-Metairie-Bogalusa, LA CSA 97.2 105.6 99.0
New York-Newark-Bridgeport, NY-NJ-CT-PA CSA 151.8 132.0 149.8
Norwich-New London, CT CBSA 119.0 116.1 121.3
Oklahoma City-Shawnee, OK CSA 92.0 95.4 89.6
Omaha-Council Bluffs-Fremont, NE-IA CSA 89.6 95.5 89.0
Orlando-Deltona-Daytona Beach CSA 104.8 111.0 111.4
Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL CBSA 97.4 106.3 110.2
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL CBSA 96.8 100.0 98.1
Peoria-Canton, IL CSA 97.7 96.1 94.1
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Philadelphia-Camden-Vineland, PA-NJ-DE-MD CSA 122.7 117.0 116.0
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ CBSA 102.2 106.8 112.8
Pittsburgh-New Castle, PA CSA 95.9 94.3 90.2
Port St. Lucie-Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL CSA 104.2 108.5 114.2
Portland-Lewiston-South Portland, ME CSA* 120.2 106.2 115.0
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA CBSA 113.6 111.4 120.9
Prescott, AZ CBSA 109.8 106.1 119.6
Pueblo, CO CBSA 90.4 90.6 90.0
Raleigh-Durham-Cary, NC CSA 95.7 101.8 98.6
Reno-Sparks-Fernley, NV CSA 110.6 111.0 126.8
Richmond, VA CBSA 109.0 105.1 104.4
Roanoke, VA CBSA 92.0 94.7 93.3
Rochester-Batavia-Seneca Falls, NY CSA 102.3 105.7 97.9
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Truckee, CA-NV CSA* 123.8 116.1 135.9
Salt Lake City-Ogden-Clearfield, UT CSA 100.0 103.1 100.9
San Antonio, TX CBSA 92.7 97.5 89.5
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA CBSA 148.3 133.8 164.2
San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, CA CSA 157.9 141.8 184.8
Sarasota-Bradenton-Punta Gorda, FL CSA 103.4 110.6 118.2
Savannah-Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA CSA 102.2 103.0 102.2
Seattle-Tacoma-Olympia, WA CSA 114.1 114.9 127.0
Shreveport-Bossier City-Minden, LA CSA 93.3 92.7 89.3
Sioux Falls, SD CBSA 92.5 94.3 90.8
South Bend-Elkhart-Mishawaka, IN-MI CSA 94.2 94.2 89.6
Spokane, WA CBSA 98.5 102.3 100.7
Springfield, IL CBSA 92.8 95.3 89.2
Springfield, MO CBSA 92.9 93.1 90.8
St. Louis-St. Charles-Farmington, MO-IL CSA 97.0 97.9 95.1
Stockton, CA CBSA* 121.9 113.5 134.2
Syracuse-Auburn, NY CSA 100.8 101.8 96.3
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL CBSA 100.0 106.4 107.8
Toledo-Fremont, OH CSA 98.1 95.3 94.9
Topeka, KS CBSA 91.0 93.6 87.9
Tucson, AZ CBSA 99.6 103.0 108.1
Tulsa-Bartlesville, OK CSA 91.1 95.0 90.5
Tuscaloosa, AL CBSA 95.2 97.8 96.1
Valdosta, GA CBSA 93.2 92.7 91.0
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 
CBSA 105.7 104.4 105.9
Waco, TX CBSA 89.7 92.3 86.2
Washington-Baltimore-Northern VA, DC-MD-VA-
WV CSA 133.4 121.5 128.6
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA CBSA 92.5 90.9 88.1
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Wausau-Merrill, WI CSA 94.0 94.7 91.0
Wichita-Winfield, KS CSA 94.9 94.7 88.4
York-Hanover-Gettysburg, PA CSA 101.5 97.9 98.0
Youngstown-Warren-East Liverpool, OH-PA CSA 94.4 89.9 88.6
*Indicates ACCRA data are not available for 2005. 
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Appendix Table C: Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Data Source 
Log Wage Current Population Survey 
Worker Characteristics Current Population Survey 
Baseline Price Index ACCRA 
Rent-based Modified Price Index American Community Survey & ACCRA 
Housing Value-based Modified Price Index American Community Survey & ACCRA 
Quality-Adjusted Gross Rents American Community Survey 
Quality-Adjusted Housing Values American Community Survey 
Non-housing Prices ACCRA 
Gulf Coast Consulted Map 
Atlantic Coast Consulted Map 
Pacific Coast Consulted Map 
January Temperature ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
July Temperature ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
January Sun ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
July Humidity ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
% Water Area ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
Topography 2 ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
Topography 3 ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
Topography 4 ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
Topography 5 ERS Natural Amenities Scale 
Precipitation Cities Ranked and Rated 
Snow Cities Ranked and Rated 
Violent Crime USA Counties Website 
Property Crime USA Counties Website 
Mean Commute Time American Community Survey 
Ozone EPA AirData Database 
Particulate Matter (2.5) EPA AirData Database 
Census Division Indicators Assigned According to Census Geography 
City Size Indicators Population Estimates according to Census Bureau 
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Appendix Table D: Additional 2SLS Regression Results for Preferred Specification 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006 0.994*** 0.106 
Mean Commute Time 0.122 0.273 
Gulf Coast 0.002 0.015 
Atlantic Coast -0.028* 0.016 
Pacific Coast -0.034 0.035 
Precipitation 0.102 0.075 
Snow -0.029 0.028 
January Temperature -0.296*** 0.104 
July Temperature 0.184 0.217 
January Sun -0.008 0.019 
July Humidity -0.001 0.072 
% Water Area -0.140*** 0.036 
Topography 2 -0.009 0.008 
Topography 3 0.006 0.013 
Topography 4 -0.009 0.013 
Topography 5 -0.024 0.019 
Violent Crime 6.227*** 2.195 
Property Crime 0.230 0.588 
Particulate Matter (2.5) 0.733*** 0.279 
Ozone -1.428 1.001 
Middle Atlantic -0.047*** 0.016 
East North Central 0.021 0.021 
West North Central 0.000 0.020 
South Atlantic 0.007 0.020 
East South Central -0.013 0.025 
West South Central 0.028 0.025 
Mountain 0.073** 0.032 
Pacific 0.037 0.048 
Size 2: 200,000-299,999 -0.005 0.019 
Size 3: 300,000-499,999 -0.009 0.021 
Size 4: 500,000-999,999 0.002 0.017 
Size 5: 1,000,000-1,999,999 0.031* 0.018 
Size 6: 2,000,000-4,999,999 0.041** 0.019 
Size 7: 5,000,000 and over 0.027 0.025 
9 Years of Schooling 0.029** 0.012 
10 Years of Schooling 0.075*** 0.014 
11 Years of Schooling 0.094*** 0.020 
12 Years of Schooling, No Diploma 0.118*** 0.013 
12 Years of Schooling, HS Diploma or GED 0.203*** 0.014 
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GED -0.062*** 0.011 
Some College 0.294*** 0.017 
Associate's Degree 0.371*** 0.016 
Bachelor's Degree 0.542*** 0.019 
Master's Degree 0.674*** 0.021 
Professional Degree 0.977*** 0.024 
Doctorate Degree 0.862*** 0.035 
Experience 0.049*** 0.003 
Experience2 -0.002*** 0.000 
Experience3 0.000*** 0.000 
Experience4 -0.000*** 0.000 
Female -0.161*** 0.004 
Black -0.129*** 0.006 
Asian -0.036*** 0.011 
Hispanic -0.126*** 0.009 
Other -0.077*** 0.012 
Married 0.081*** 0.004 
Employed Part-time -0.114*** 0.006 
Naturalized Citizen -0.072*** 0.009 
Non-Citizen -0.182*** 0.014 
Enrolled Part-time in School 0.025 0.015 
Union Member 0.152*** 0.008 
Federal Government Employee 0.315*** 0.044 
State Government Employee 0.038 0.044 
Local Government Employee 0.067 0.043 
Non-profit Sector Employee -0.065*** 0.011 
Mining Industry 0.505*** 0.075 
Construction Industry 0.215*** 0.046 
Manufacturing Industry 0.256*** 0.042 
Wholesale or Retail Trade Industry 0.074* 0.040 
Transportation or Utilities Industry 0.252*** 0.041 
Information Industry 0.271*** 0.043 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Industry 0.260*** 0.042 
Professional and Business Services Industry 0.216*** 0.042 
Education and Health Services Industry 0.121*** 0.041 
Hospitality Industry 0.013 0.042 
Other Services Industry 0.044 0.043 
Management Occupation 0.349*** 0.009 
Professional Specialty Occupation 0.246*** 0.012 
Service Occupation 0.027*** 0.009 
Sales Occupation 0.163*** 0.010 
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Administrative Occupation 0.070*** 0.008 
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupation 0.054 0.039 
Construction and Extraction Occupation 0.149*** 0.011 
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupation 0.170*** 0.010 
Production Occupation 0.026** 0.012 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by CBSA/CSA.  Regression results are for the 
preferred specification in the first column of Table 4 in which the log of the rent-
based price index is instrumented using log gross rents from the previous year.  See 
the text and Table 4 for further information. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
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